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Abstract

This paper hopes to provide an American Pragmatist reading of the Effective Altruism philosophy and
movement. The criticism levied against Effective Altruism here begins from one of its founding principles, and
extends to practical aspects of the movement. The utilitarian leaders of Effective Altruism consider Sidgwick’s
‘point of view of the universe’ an objective starting point of determining ethics. Using Quality Adjusted Life
Years (QALYs), a popular measure in contemporary welfare economics, they provide a “universal currency for
misery” for evaluating decisions. Through this method, one can calculate exactly the value of each moral
decision by identifying which one yields more QALYs, and, apparently, objectively come to a conclusion
about the moral worth of seemingly unrelated situations, for example, whether it is more moral to donate
money so as to help women suffering from painful childbirth-induced fistulas, or to donate to starving
children in famine-ridden areas. What’s more, not making the choice that yields more QALYs is “unfair” to
those one could have helped more, thus immoral.
This paper provides, first a pragmatist conception of epistemology (or lack of it), in contrast to the
Sidgwickian one held by the utilitarian effective altruists, and then explores how holding either
epistemological position affects our ethical viewpoints and actions. It argues that the utilitarian conception is
the wrong place, and way, from which to view all ethical action. It contends that Effective Altruism, in seeking
to reorder society to meet its abstractly conceived teleological utilitarian moral ideal (as measured by QALYsa measure settled upon by the movement’s leaders), is undemocratic, and ultimately misses much of the
complexity and messiness provided by contingencies, personal and cultural, that is present in, and important
to, human life. Altruism done this way is atomizing and thoughtless; and it depicts to a high degree what
William James referred to as a “certain blindness in human beings” - the lack of recognition that different
things matter to different people, and that it is impossible to aggregate these claims relative to a moral standard
that exists outside their particular individual and societal experiences.
The paper then provides a pragmatist reading of meliorism, as found in the works of John Dewey, William
James, Richard Rorty and Jane Addams; a view of meliorism that hearkens towards solidarity and not
objectivity; one that is not only democratic, cognizant of contingencies and focused on habit, but also, by its
insistence on viewing ourselves as members of communities and societies, saves us from the moral
atomization of Effective Altruism and its insistence on individual moral responsibility and action in line with
“objective truths”, as opposed to collective and political action to address contingent issues.
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Pragmatists hope to make anti-philosophical points in non-philosophical language.
Richard Rorty
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ABSTRACT

This paper hopes to provide an American Pragmatist reading of the Effective Altruism
philosophy and movement. The criticism levied against Effective Altruism here begins from
one of its founding principles, and extends to practical aspects of the movement. The
utilitarian leaders of Effective Altruism consider Sidgwick’s ‘point of view of the universe’
an objective starting point of determining ethics. Using Quality Adjusted Life Years
(QALYs), a popular measure in contemporary welfare economics, they provide a “universal
currency for misery”1 for evaluating decisions. Through this method, one can calculate
exactly the value of each moral decision by identifying which one yields more QALYs, and,
apparently, objectively come to a conclusion about the moral worth of seemingly unrelated
situations, for example, whether it is more moral to donate money so as to help women
suffering from painful childbirth-induced fistulas, or to donate to starving children in
famine-ridden areas2. What’s more, not making the choice that yields more QALYs is
“unfair”3 to those one could have helped more, thus immoral.

1

Srinivasan, Amia. (2015). “Stop the Robot Apocalypse”. Review of “Doing Good Better: How
Effective Altruism can Help you help Others, Do work that Matters, and Make Smarter Choices about
Giving Back” by William MacAskill. London Review of Books.
2

MacAskill speaking about his visit to Hamlin Fistula Hospital in Ethiopia: “When I’d visited Ethiopia
several years before, I’d visited this hospital. I ’d hugged the women who suffered from this condition,
and they’d thanked me for visiting them. It had been an important experience for me: a vivid first-hand
demonstration of the severity of the problems in the world. This was a cause I had a personal
connection with. Should I have donated to the Fistula Foundation, even knowing I could do more to
help people if I donated elsewhere? I do not think so. If I were to give to the Fistula Foundation rather
than to charities I thought were more effective, I would be privileging the needs of some people over
others for emotional rather than moral reasons. That would be unfair to those I could have helped
more. If I’d visited some other shelter in Ethiopia, or in any other country, I would have had a different
set of personal connections. It was arbitrary that I’d seen this particular problem at close quarters.”
DGB, pg. 41.
3

MacAskill, William. (2015). Doing Good Better, pg. 42
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This paper provides, first a pragmatist conception of epistemology (or lack of it), in
contrast to the Sidgwickian one held by the utilitarian effective altruists, and then explores
how holding either epistemological position affects our ethical viewpoints and actions. It
argues that the utilitarian conception is the wrong place, and way, from which to view all
ethical action. It contends that Effective Altruism, in seeking to reorder society to meet its
abstractly conceived teleological utilitarian moral ideal (as measured by QALYs- a measure
settled upon by the movement’s leaders), is undemocratic, and ultimately misses much of the
complexity and messiness provided by contingencies, personal and cultural, that is present in,
and important to, human life. Altruism done this way is atomizing and thoughtless; and it
depicts to a high degree what William James referred to as a “certain blindness in human
beings”4 - the lack of recognition that different things matter to different people, and that it is
impossible to aggregate these claims relative to a moral standard that exists outside their
particular individual and societal experiences.

The paper then provides a pragmatist reading of meliorism, as found in the works of
John Dewey, William James, Richard Rorty and Jane Addams; a view of meliorism that
hearkens towards solidarity and not objectivity; one that is not only democratic, cognizant of
contingencies and focused on habit, but also, by its insistence on viewing ourselves as
members of communities and societies, saves us from the moral atomization of Effective
Altruism and its insistence on individual moral responsibility and action in line with
“objective truths”, as opposed to collective and political action to address contingent issues.

4

James, William. (1899). On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings. Penguin
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INTRODUCTION
Philosophy is often accused of not being engaged with the world; of being conducted
from the “armchair”, such that the questions it troubles itself with have more to do with
abstract theorizing than with the actual lived lives of human beings. This thesis is, first and
foremost then, an exploration of two philosophies - Effective Altruism and American
Pragmatism- that repudiate this contention; that actively involve themselves in meliorism engagement with the world in a bid to improve it.

Much more importantly, however, this thesis discusses how these philosophical
movements go about their work. In doing this, it presents a critique against the Effective
Altruism philosophy and movement, beginning from its epistemological framework (the meta
theory about knowledge that grounds it) and extending to its practical aspects. Conversely,
the thesis champions the methodological anti-epistemological framework of the American
Pragmatists, and argues that this framework leads to much better practical consequences.

The primary material informing this thesis comprised, on the one hand; books, journal
articles, newspaper & magazine essays and profiles, YouTube videos & other online
resources, and correspondence with members of the Effective Altruism movement and
philosophy, as well as some engagement with older texts on utilitarianism that provided the
grounding epistemological framework for Effective Altruism. On the other hand, I made use
of books, articles and encyclopedia entries that dealt with the American Pragmatist school of
philosophy, with particular emphasis on the works of John Dewey - whose papers I accessed
through Southern Illinois University, William James, Jane Addams, Richard Rorty and
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Charles Sanders-Peirce. I also read many books on related non-philosophical topics,
particularly in development and welfare economics, social choice theory, history, and
sociology.

The thesis is structured as a series of three extended essays meant to be read together.
The first essay, Objectivity, Contingency, Solidarity provides an overview of the
epistemological debates grounding both schools of philosophy discussed here. On the one
hand, Henry Sidgwick’s utilitarian “Point of view of the Universe” which undergirds
Effective Altruism. This view holds that any notion of “good”, and therefore of meliorism, is
to be understood as being grounded on an objective truth - arrived at from an impartial and
maximizing point of view. The view thus presents a universal currency, one of utility, under
which any melioristic program can be measured against. If we have two issues that we care
about, then this view demands that we subject them to this maximization test, and the one that
maximizes becomes the one that we are rationally and ethically compelled to adopt or
champion.

On the other hand, pragmatist anti-epistemology. By this view there is no such thing
as an objective, metaphysical truth. Truth, rather, is a human creation that enables us to attain
certain preferable states and consequences in the world. By this view, attempts at meliorism
should not refer back to an immaterial objective truth - as Sidgwick does, but should instead
seek to engender democratic consensus and solidarity about how to best tackle the problems
we face in the world.
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The second essay, Shall We Leave it to The Experts, explores what I consider to be the
flaws of Effective Altruism, based on its adoption of Sidgwick’s epistemology. I argue
extensively that Effective Altruism’s adoption of objectivity promotes moral heedlessness by promoting moral “experts” ; that it does not engage sufficiently with systemic and
structural change; and, as with all utilitarian philosophies, that it demands too much, morally,
from us.

The third essay, Democratic Vistas, explores how meliorism might look like if we are
to adopt the (anti) epistemological framework of the American Pragmatists as opposed to that
of the utilitarians. It sets forth a democratic, contingent, and pliable account of improving the
world; one that insists on political solidarity as the framework for meliorism, as opposed to
one that appeals to objectivity.

The conclusion of the thesis urges that we turn away from epistemological accounts
of objectivity, and instead to political accounts of solidarity as the grounding for our
engagement with the world; to, in our melioristic endeavors, ask the political question - “what
are the consequences of this?” as opposed to the epistemological question - “what is this?”
Doing this, I argue, results in better practical consequences in the world, and in a philosophy
that is truly engaged.

This thesis was generously funded by a fellowship from the Wolf Humanities Center,
and by a grant from the Benjamin Franklin Scholars Program through the Center for
Undergraduate Research and Fellowships (CURF).
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PART ONE
OBJECTIVITY, CONTINGENCY, SUBJECTIVITY

There’s some peculiar in each leaf and grain,
Some unmark’d fiber, or some varying vein,
Shall only man be taken in the gross?
Grant but as many sorts of mind as moss.

Alexander Pope, Epistle 1 to Richard Temple, Viscount Cobham.
Published. 1734.

In his work, The Method of Ethics, the Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick
undertook a remarkable defense of utilitarianism. Sidgwick sought to provide what he
deemed the correct way of, “obtaining reasoned convictions as to what ought5 to be done”6.
Pleasure, he thought, was the only thing that was “intrinsically good”. Ethical conduct, he
held, was therefore “objectively right” when its principal consideration was what would
“produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose
happiness is affectd by the conduct”7. Despite its “cumbrousness”, Sidgwick referred to this
principle as “Universalistic Hedonism”8

5

My emphasis
Sidgwick, Henry., 1874, “The Method of Ethics”. London: Macmillan and Co. 1874
7
Ibid (Book 4 Chapter 1).
8
Ibid 7
6
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But of course objective universalistic hedonism could not be arrived at subjectively.
We humans are beings with different, many times conflicting, points of views, interests,
allegiances, and so on. Moreover, we invariably tend to unfairly attach more weight to our
own interests, and to those of our loved ones, as compared to those of strangers and others far
from us. This, naturally, could not count, Sidgwick believed, as what we ought to do. Many
times, actions carried out in this way would surely not produce the greatest amount of
happiness on the whole.

Furthermore, he strongly believed, the good of one being, no matter who they were to
us, not even when they were us ourselves, was not more important, ethically speaking, than
the good of another. Sidgwick therefore, unlike his utilitarian predecessor - John Stuart Mill,
was not willing to simply leave matters at the “harm principle”9 - that our actions be limited
only when they harmed others, which is to say, that we had a negative duty not to cause harm
to others. Sidgwick extended this, believing that we had a positive duty to ensure that utility
was evenly and impartially distributed- beneficence as the balancing of the moral books.

The recourse was therefore to approach ethical action from the point of view of a
neutral observer - and neutral in this sense could not mean just any third party “human
person’. For despite our wonderfully human capabilities for rationality, our inclinations

9

It is interesting to note that some pragmatist appropriate Mill or claim him as one of their own.
William James, for example, dedicates his book, “Pragmatism”, to Mill - “To the memory of John
Stuart Mill, from whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind, and whom my fancy likes to
picture as our leader were he here today” . Rorty, in page 63 of Contingency, Irony and Solidarity,
while briefly discussing the harm principle, says, “J. S. Mill's suggestion that governments devote
themselves to optimizing the balance between leaving people's private lives alone and preventing
suffering seems to me pretty much the last word”.
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towards justice; we were all by virtue of our humanity, knowingly or unknowingly, either
contaminated by allegiance, or simply ignorant of what was ‘truly good’. Instead of this
inherent subjectivity, Sidgwick called upon us to imagine what a truly reasonable, perfectly
neutral, observing entity - neutral insofar as they were, of course, impartial, but also very
importantly, maximizing- would hold. And this was supposed to be the viewpoint we were
ethically and rationally compelled to adopt. Sidgwick termed this the “point of view of the
universe”.

This view has long since dominated the utilitarian school. According to it, like
Gradgrind’s fact pitchers10, we are supposed to think of ourselves simply as containers for
utility. In a detached way therefore, what it means to do good and to be good, is to
redistribute that utility as impartially and as efficiently as possible so as to be maximizing.
The view has influenced the work of philosophers with a utilitarian bent into areas of inquiry
outside philosophical ethics (though obviously with deep implications within ethical theory).
For example, in philosophy of mind, Derek Parfit, a highly influential utilitarian philosopher,
very much influenced by Sidgwick, wrote a brilliant account, exploring issues such as the
unity of consciousness and brain bisection, to argue why personal identity does not matter11,
which is to say, why the particular contingencies of individual life do not matter. The
corollary in ethics to this question in the philosophy of mind is obvious (even if it may be

10

See: Dickens, Charles. (1854). “Hard Times for these Times”. London: Chapman & Hall. Here,
Dickens parodies Thomas Gradgrind, the utilitarian headmaster of a school - who has also named all
his children after famous utilitarians, including Thomas Malthus. Gradgrind insists that the students in
his school learn only “useful” knowledge - “facts, facts, facts”. Gradgrind conceives of the children as
nothing more than repositories for these facts.
11

Parfit, Derek. 1984. “Reasons and Persons”. Chapter 12: “Why our Identity is not What Matters”.
Oxford University Press.
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argued that the connection I draw here is tenuous): If individual personal identity, the starting
point of all subjectivity, does not matter, how could ethical viewpoints arising from it?12
What matters, in both mind and ethics, these accounts hold, is something above and beyond,
something objective.

Other contemporary utilitarians, too, seem to have doubled down on Sidgwick. Peter
Singer and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek in their book “The Point of View of the Universe:
Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics” as well as in other works13, advance several arguments
on disparate issues, for example the evolutionary basis for moral judgements; whether
preference utilitarianism is preferable to hedonistic utilitarianism; the call for universal
beneficence - and its demandingness, and many other issues of the like. The central
foundation upon which the arguments of these contemporary utilitarians lie is this idea that
Sidgwick’s point of view of the universe is the correct standpoint from which to view these
ethical issues.

Non-utilitarian philosophers have also explored the question of an objective point of
view. Thomas Nagel, famously a Kantian, in his temperate exposition of ethical viewpoints,
outlined a contrast. The first: A “view from nowhere”14, a supposedly objective “place”
(which is “nowhere in particular, really”15) where the only valuable insights are ones reached

The pragmatists I discuss here do not deny the existence of this contingency. But they diverge from
the utilitarians in that they think this contingency does matter. In fact, they assert that it matters so
much that anything prescribing an objective view over and above it is ridiculous
12

13

De Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna., Singer, Peter. (2012). “The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of
Practical Reason”. Ethics , Vol. 123, No. 1 (October 2012), pp. 9-31
14
15

Nagel, Thomas. 1986., “The View from Nowhere”.:
Ibid page 14
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“independently” - which is to say - detached from any individual perspective. Insofar as there
is a world of things, contends Nagel, there is an objective standpoint from where we can view
that world over and above our interests and experiences; an objective perspective of world
qua world.

The second: a subjective view, the stuff of everyday individualized experiences,
drawn from consciousness - joy, taste, pain, color perception, love, passion, etcetera. We
consciously feel and perceive things, consciously have experiences of this second kind, but
the best we can do is to analogize them for others - I feel pain in this way, other feeling
beings are like me qua feeling, so they must feel pain in this way too. But, Nagel holds, we
can never objectively understand the “stuff” of these subjective experiences; it is the realm of
qualia. What is it like to be a bat?16 How do scrambled eggs taste to a cockroach?17- It is not
solipsism, for we do not deny that other minds exist, and that other beings think and feel; it is
instead a case of epistemic inadequacy, one not acknowledged by physicalist theories in
philosophy of mind when attempting to explain consciousness.

There is such a thing, Nagel thinks, as phenomenal experience; what it is like to be a
particular conscious being. And try as we might, we cannot objectively detail the exact
substance of these subjective experiences. In this sense, we cannot have a “point of view of
the universe” about these issues. What this would mean, Nagel’s account implies, would be
that a good theory of ethics, like a good theory of mind, would need to take into account the

16
17

Nagel, Thomas, 1974. “What is it like to be a bat?” The Philosophical Review, October 1974
Ibid 16
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existence of this subjectivity. This, of course, is not to say that a good ethical theory needs to
be relativistic; that is far from what Nagel means.

Nagel’s solution is to not prefer one viewpoint over another. For him, objectivity can
never completely override inherent subjectivity, or vice versa. Instead, he concludes that both
views, subjective and objective, must learn to coexist alongside one another; that though this
is a difficult balance, it is what we must nevertheless consistently aspire to18. For Nagel, we
must somehow learn to juggle the demands of both viewpoints. We must be careful that the
call of the subjective affect does not entirely relieve us from the demands of the ‘objective’
ethical. But we must also guard that we are not puritanical with ethical objectivity at the cost
of all subjectivity, that we maintain a level of recognition for the inherent subjectiveness of
human perspectives and experiences.

This solution is deeply honest, even if not satisfying. Nagel is not simply interested in
us being good by “doing good” i.e. maximizing utility, as the utilitarians would have it. He
also acknowledges our basic individuated humanity, and is interested in us being good in a
subjective sense; as conscious individual beings, with thoughts and feelings and desires that
are unique; with experiences that are non-generalizable and deeply personally meaningful.
Here Kantianism and other non-consequentialist philosophies provide a refreshing reprieve
from the ‘demandingness’19 of utilitarianism.

Williams, Bernard. 1986. “A Passion for the Beyond”. Review of “The View from Nowhere” by
Thomas Nagel. London Review of Books. Vol. 8, No. 14. 7 August 1986.
18

19

The word demandingness is placed in quotes since its use here may be contentious. The way the
word is usually used, as regards to utilitarianism, involves the idea that following the logic of
consequentialism, some actions we typically deem to be supererogatory (praiseworthy but not
obligatory) become obligatory. For example, if we are to be persuaded by argument that it is morally

May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania
15

Nevertheless, this is not the view of the pragmatist school, which is the main focus of
this work, and which shall substantively be outlined within the course of this essay.

American Pragmatism has a tenuous relationship with epistemology - something that
Cornel West called an “evasion”20 of Philosophy. Pragmatists reject the idea, seen as the goal
of philosophy since Plato, of philosophy as proceeding towards truth; of the task of
epistemology being the discovery of a certain knowledge about the world. Typically, many
philosophers think of the world, and of morality, as an already formed analytical unit, with its
own rules and ways of working- ways of working that we come to discover through science,
philosophy, and other forms of inquiry21, and then live correctly with respect to.

For the pragmatists, however, the world and things in it exist, sure, and human beings,
like other animals, exist in the world too. But that is it. There is no inherent sense of right or
required of us, not just that it would be praiseworthy, to donate a certain amount of our income to
charity. The effect is that we may then reject what the argument requires of us, even though we have
accepted the argument itself, because the argument so violates our intuitions and our usual way of
doing things. The way I use the word ‘demandingness’ here at the very least complicates the relation
of superogation/ obligation behind it. I hearken to a distinction made by Nagel; that of agent-neutrality
and agent-relativity. Agent-neutral situations are the parallels to Nagel’s view of what is “objective”, as
in, it applies indiscriminately for everyone: “everybody, generally speaking, has a reason to want pain
to stop, even if it is not his pain” - that is an ‘objective’ standpoint from which we can view pain. The
agent-relative situation, on the other hand, would apply only to particular individuals, for example, “I
want to graduate in May, so I must stay in school”. Nobody else really cares if I don’t graduate in May,
though. Agent-relative situations, like agent-neutral situations, have degrees of importance, and these
agent situations cannot be mapped onto each other one to one. If an agent-relative situation would
seem to me, in my judgement, to require much more of my attention and resources than an
agent-neutral one, contends Nagel, then in his view, it is not immoral to choose the agent-relative
situation. This complicates the idea of the demandingness objection.
20

West, Cornel. (1989). “The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism”.
University of Wisconsin Press.
21

This conception of epistemology, as Elizabeth Anscombe suggested, makes sense if one believes
in intelligent design, yet many philosophers who reject intelligent design, Peter Singer for example,
still hold on to this view of epistemology.
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wrong, true or false, that exists in the world before conscious subjects give it meaning - and
this happens through language. It is not that the qualia Nagel mentions constitute a subjective
truth of some sort that is unknowable because of epistemic inadequacy, or that, in the same
vein, there are objective truths that are knowable through epistemology. It is, rather, that there
are no truths outside of the experiences and linguistic structures of human beings; no
teleogized ideals. Pragmatists deny epistemology in its entirety - they do not have one, much
less a relativistic one. Philosophy, the pragmatists think, should thus reorient its goals from a
search for truth, to an attempt to understand the products of the interactions of human habits
and impulses which produce social and moral conditions.

John Dewey says on this:

“When it is acknowledged that under the disguise of dealing with ultimate reality,
philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded in social traditions, that it
has sprung from a clash of social ends and from a conflict of inherited institutions with
incompatible contemporary tendencies, it will be seen that the task of future philosophy is to
clarify men’s ideas as to the social and moral strife of their own day. Its aim is to become, as
far as is humanly possible an organ for dealing with these conflicts” 22

There is thus a third way that pragmatism offers in this tussle between teleogized
essentialism and abject relativism: the recognition of contingency. Contingency is certainly
not objectivity, but it is also not s ubjectivity in the relativistic sense - it is not a trivialism
22

Quotation lifted from: West, Cornell. (1989). The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of
Pragmatism. Chapter 4; pg. 112.

May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania
17

which renders us incapable of action because all possible choices are of equal merit23.
Contingency, rather, is the predication of some things/events on other things/events, such that
we realize that things could be (or could have been) otherwise, that the world is always
presenting us with new information to challenge any beliefs we hold, and therefore that no
beliefs stand on absolute solid ground. But at the same time, it is the recognition of the fact
that within the world as it is now, there are intersubjective agreements (obviously not
universal) on how certain things are, or should be, in order to best serve present purposes, and
that for practical reasons, if one were to try to assert claims of subjectivity upon certain
agreements within certain communities, one would not be taken seriously.

The result of this is an acknowledgment that the truths we hold now are not inherent
or immutable, they are changeable, but that it is useful to hold them - even to advocate
strongly for them - because they serve particular present purposes for us. When doubt arises
in us about the value of these truths, an acknowledgement of contingency calls on us to assess
practicable results, to make any changes we do on the basis of these potential results (while
acknowledging their contingency), not to instead refer to some objectivity that exists outside
of ourselves, as the determining factor in judging which truths we should then adopt; nor to
throw up our hands and relativistically, hopelessly, claim it is all the same. At the center of
this acknowledgement of contingency however, must always be democratic experience.
Changes made must always be agreed upon by the broadest group of people they will affect,
and not instigated by coercion, nor accepted purely on authority.

Wieland, J. W. (2012) Can Pyrrhonists act normally? Philosophical Explorations: An International
Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 15(3):277-289.
23
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For example, Carlin Romano24 in his discussion of Richard Rorty’s work, gives the
example of the sentence “Beijing is the capital city of China”. This “fact” is rooted in our
language and shared intersubjective agreement, such that if today someone were to say that
“Shenzhen is the capital city of China”, we would think him “objectively” wrong. This
person could not reasonably say that it was his “subjective” opinion that Shenzhen is the
capital city of China; that that was what was true to him. This supposed ‘objectivity’ in
Beijing being China’s capital, however, is not a function of the world. There is nothing
inherent in Beijing that necessitates that it is the capital of China, and if tomorrow the
government of China decided to make Shenzhen the capital, we would quickly update our
language and ways of behaviour. “Shenzhen is the capital city of China” would be the new
“objective” fact.

But these “facts” , as I have been arguing, are contingent on our intersubjective
agreement; they are not facts from nowhere, independent of us. If a critical mass of us
continued acting as if Beijing were still the capital city of China, then the government of
China might have a problem on its hands, and for practicable reasons, might be forced to
redesignate Beijing as China’s capital.

In other terms, an acknowledgement of contingency would mean a “stuttering
conviction”, as Alexander Livingston suggests from his reading of William James. Stuttering
convictions are unlike both relativism and absolutism; they are “at once principled and

24

Romano, Carlin. Carlin. (2017). “America the Philosophical”. Chapter on “Rorty’s Revolution”. Pg.
126-160. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
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reflective, held passionately but not blindly”25- which is to say that they enable us to act in the
world, to act on our convictions, but to be open enough to revising them in the face of new
evidence.

This is only possible when we reorient ourselves not to think teleologically. When we
change our convictions in the face of new evidence, that is not to say that the convictions we
previously held were “wrong” and the ones we now hold are “right”. Rather, it it is to say that
those convictions served our purposes best then, and these other ones do so now - perhaps
because we have come across new information, or perhaps because we have expanded the
boundaries of who we consider “us” to be. When we attempt to convince others to adopt our
convictions similarly, the idea is not that our convictions have a better relation to an objective
impartial immaterial criterion of truth than theirs. Rather, what we are trying to do is to have
them join us in our intersubjective community of agreement, with the knowledge that this
broader community of agreement makes practicable action in the world easier, and of more
use to everyone involved.

The pragmatists therefore do not accept Nagel’s objective “view from nowhere”.
They do not deny that we could agree on how to view particular scenarios, as argued above;
that we could have a shared language for speaking about particular experiences of and in the
world. What they do deny, is that there could be such a thing as “objectivity” existing over
and above human beings and their activities; a neutral arbiter out in the world that balances
the activities of human beings in terms of absolute wrongs and rights. Both Dewey and James
25

Livingston, Alexander. (2016). Damn Great Empires!: William James and the Politics of
Pragmatism. Pg. 106.
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disapprove of the “quest for certainty” which they see mainstream philosophy to be engaged
in. For James, the existence of objective truth is “just one more subjective opinion which one
can add to their list of other subjective opinions”26.

For Richard Rorty who perhaps does the most work in outlining contingency,
language is contingent; selfhood is contingent, and the assertion of an objective “truth” in any
domain is simply a failure to recognize this contingency. For him, as for Dewey and James,
there are no essences, no grander truths out there; and we do not discover or realize truths or
meaning out in the world, or through some Mathematical process: we create it as it serves our
purposes, and we discard it when it stops doing so. Rorty thinks that only propositions
developed in sentences - which are parts of vocabularies developed by human beings- could
be true or false. Things in the world cannot be true or false; things in the world just are.

Because propositions and sentences and languages are human creations, and because
only propositions can be true or false, it serves that “truth” too is a human creation. The more
interesting question to ask of something in the world, therefore, is not whether it is real, or
true/ false, but rather, “What use is it?”27 In this sense, the notion that oxygen, and not
phlogiston, was responsible for combustion, as Johann Becher convinced the European
scientific world of the 17th century, or that black people are ‘equal’ to white people (Rorty’s
example)28 which has now come to be accepted by all non-racists as an immutable “fact”, was

26

James, William. (1896). The Will to Believe.

27

See, Romano, Carlin. (2017). “America the Philosophical”. Chapter on “Rorty’s Revolution”. Pg.
126-160. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
28
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not an objective fact we came to “discover”. Rather, it was simply a new vocabulary we came
to adopt because it came to serve our purposes better, or, as in the case of slavery, because we
(“we” here being initially white Americans) expanded our notions of who “we” were (to
include blacks)29.

This notion of being trapped within our linguistics and ethno-cultural contexts too, is
the idea of Deweyan Pragmatic Instrumentalism: that “real objects are nothing but the things
it pays for us to have names for in certain schemes of interactions”30.

Rorty says on this:

For pragmatists, the desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape the limitations of
one's community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible, the
desire to extend the reference of "us" as far as we can. Insofar as pragmatists make a
distinction between knowledge and opinion, it is simply the dist inction between topics on
which such agreement is relatively easy to get and topics on which agreement is relatively
hard to get31.

This then is a pragmatic acknowledgment of the contingency of the relationship in
which we stand to the world. The assumption people like the utilitarians, and to an extent

29

This presents an interesting discussion when we consider issues involving what we deem the
ethical treatment of animals. What would expanding the “we” to include animals look like? How do we
do this outside a metaphysical and epistemological grounding of something shared?
30
Glaude, Eddie. (20007). “In the Shade of Blue”. Pg. 63.
31
Rorty, Richard. (1998). Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America.
Harvard University Press. Pg 169
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Nagel, make when they make claims about “objectivity” is to think that there is, as Rorty
says, such a relation of “fitting the world or being faithful to the true nature of the self in
which language might stand in relation to non-language. This assumption goes hand in hand
with the assumption that “our language” is somehow … a unity, a third thing which stands in
some determinate relation with two other unities, the self and reality32. If we think of
language as contingent, and therefore do not conceive of it as a “medium” for representation
of the world to the self; if we do not think that there are “non-linguistic things called
‘meanings’ which it is the task of language to express, and non-linguistic entities called
‘facts’ which it is the task of language to represent”, then we cannot possibly have a “view
from nowhere”33.

This essay weaves these themes of contingency, subjectivity and objectivity
throughout their discussion of how the Effective Altruism movement has marshalled the idea
of an “objective” moral truth to present its core claims. The sleight of hand here is that once
the idea of an “objective truth” and the teleology following from it is accepted, then action
begins to be judged relative to this abstraction, and any notion of democracy in determining
ethical action is thus deemed unnecessary, even wasteful. One then hears concepts of
“immorality” invoked, to refer to ideas and actions which diverge from this teleogized
objectivity.

32

Rorty, Richard. (1989). Contingency, Irony, Solidarity. Cambridge University Press (Pg. 13.)

33

For more clarification see chapter 1 of Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. “The Contingency of
Language”.
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The subsequent parts of the essay assess Sidgwick’s idea of the point of view of
universe with respect to beneficence - our duty to aid, and with specific regards to the
contemporary Effective Altruism movement. The essay then contrasts the idea of the point of
view of the universe with a different account provided by the American pragmatist
philosophers, mainly John Dewey, William James, Richard Rorty, and Jane Addams. It
outlines Dewey’s criticism of teleological -ultimate end- philosophy, rejecting, as Dewey
does, any a priori “fixed reference point outside of conduct”34.

This essay does not go as far as proposing a detailed, practical pragmatist program for
beneficence, especially the kind of beneficence that the Effective Altruists are involved in.
Many philosophers have developed rich accounts for conceptualizing such issues, the ones
that readily come to mind being the Capabilities Approach championed by Amartya Sen35 and
Martha Nussbaum36, and some approaches which attempt to extend Rawlsian principles of
justice to international societies, for example those presented by Thomas Pogge37. Even
though I may periodically refer to some of these approaches and sometimes even critique

34

See: Dewey, John., 1922. “Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology”
Chapter 1. Henry Holt and Company; New York.
35

Sen, Amartya. (2001). “Development as Freedom”. Oxford University Press.
Sen, Amartya. (1992).”Inequality Re-examined”. Russell-Sage Foundation
Sen, Amartya. (1985). “Commodities and Capabilities”. Elsevier Publishing
36

Nussbaum, Martha. (2006). “Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership”.
Belknap Press/Harvard University.
Nussbaum, Martha. (2011). “Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach”. Belknap
Press/Harvard University.
37

Pogge, Thomas. (1989). “Realizing Rawls”. Cornell University Press.
Pogge, Thomas. (2008). “World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and
Reforms”. Polity.
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them briefly, the scope of these works is beyond me, and my goals are altogether much more
humble.

Indeed Pragmatism cannot provide such an account - for such an account is
independent of contingency. To say that this is what pragmatism thinks beneficence should
look like is to fall into the same trap of asserting supposed objectivity. All Pragmatism can do
is to recommend that we abandon all teleology, that we consistently doubt our beliefs, that we
make use of every available evidence; that our beliefs be developed with regards to human
action and not abstractly. In this way, Pragmatism presents “less a doctrine than a manner of
orienting oneself towards a world of competing and conflicting moral ideals”38. Yet in taking
up this orientation, our actions and their consequences would look remarkably different, and
that has important implications for the consequences of our beneficent actions.

It is, of course, of importance to note that the work the Effective Altruists are
involved with is timely and necessary. And it is also important to note that with the arguable
exception of Kantianism and Aristotelian Virtue Ethics, no other school of thought has
contributed to moral philosophy as much as utilitarianism. This then is not a critique of
everything utilitarian, or of all (even most) of what Effective Altruism stands for. Indeed,
both Deweyan pragmatism, of which I am a strong believer, and utilitarianism are, typically,
in intention, ameliorating. Quite rightly too, many influential philosophers within the
Effective Altruism movement have pointed out that to a large extent, the issues that the
movement concerns itself with - matters concerning urgent and great human (and animal)
38

Livingston, Alexander. (2016). Damn Great Empires!: William James and the Politics of
Pragmatism. Pg. 111. Quote originally derived from James’s essay “The Moral Philosopher and the
Moral Life”.
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suffering, issues like widespread famines, deaths from preventable diseases, factory farming;
and matters concerning grander questions of species survival, like climate change and
‘technological singularity39’- can be addressed40.

To this effect the core claim of the Effective Altruism movement is a simple and
relatively non-controversial one - one that underlies pragmatism itself: that “evidence and
reason should be used to benefit others as much as possible, and that action should be taken
on that basis”41. It does not matter to a starving person that we are pragmatists, utilitarians or
deontologists. I believe this is correct. Furthermore, As William MacAskill eloquently puts it,
“Applying data and rationality to a charitable endeavor does not rob the act of virtue”42.

Indeed, a lot of money, and other resources, is wasted, whether it is by charities
which spend inordinate amounts on costs such as high employee salaries as opposed to
spending on achieving their core missions, or charities whose methods simply are mediocre at
accomplishing the results they hope for. All charities are not created equal (based, of course,
on fungible criteria that we agree on), and we should not be resistant to information that
enlightens us to which charities work better than others based on these criteria. As I have

39

For more on technological singularity - and its connection with the Effective Altruism Movement see : Bostrom, Nick. 2014. “Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies”. Oxford University Press.
Parfit, Derek. 2015. “Reasons, Persons and Effective Altruism”. Talk delivered at Harvard
University.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q6glXJ7dVU0
40

MacAskill, William. 2017. “Effective Altruism: Introduction”. Essays in Philosophy, Volume 18, Issue
1, Article 1. Pg. 2-5. Jan. 2017.
41
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MacAskill, William. (2015). “Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Help Others,
Do Work that Matters, and Make Smarter Choices about Giving Back”. Penguin Random House.
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argued, Effective Altruism in this sense; in its insistence on evidence and intelligent
reflection, in its meliorating push, is remarkably pragmatic.

Still, the ways we evaluate this evidence, what it comes to mean to us, matter. And
this is the critique that is provided in this essay. The turn from seeking consensus and using
science and technology to create more desirable outcomes, all while acknowledging
contingency, to instead asserting the objectivity of some claim, and then using this as the
reference point for everything, as the Effective Altruists have done, is what I argue against
here.

The claims of Effective Altruism are not just restricted to which charities are most
effective based on some agreed upon criteria. They not only go ahead to decide which criteria
to be used - and cloak this in objectivity- but they then also go as far as making claims about
which causes are “objectively” more effective, which careers one should go into, and so on.
They also go on, from their perch of objectivity, to make comparisons between issues of such
wide disparities, for example, as noted in the abstract, whether it is more moral to donate
money so as to help women suffering from painful childbirth-induced fistulas, or to donate to
starving children in famine-ridden areas.

These subsequent issues raise many questions, for not only do they then have
implications on what kinds of life we are to live43- and who should determine these, they also

43

80,000 Hours, an organization affiliated to Effective Altruism, acknowledges that this (80,000 hours)
is the average amount of time the average person spends working. They thus provide advising
services on which careers people should go into to maximize their social impact (as measured by
QALYs, of course).
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raise important questions about whether we can meaningfully aggregate and analyze different
issues such as the ones exemplified above, from a removed, supposedly objective, point of
view, and, importantly, whether charity donations by individuals are the best means of
approaching these issues. Like recruits to the military, following Effective Altruism means
we would defer to the movement’s leaders to tell us what actions to take, which issues should
matter, what careers to pursue.

Philosophy, done this way, then turns from an actual engagement with life in all its
complexity and messiness, to a process of calculation; of figuring out how best to achieve
“objective” ideals and teleologies. We would not only rid our lives of exploration and
experimentation, of wonderful “non-moral” things and endeavors that are important in our
lives44,but more significantly, we would be cogs in the ethical machine of Effective Altruism,
constantly waiting for the calculations to be done so we can adjust our lives accordingly. I
sincerely believe moral philosophy has more to offer than this.

Negative philosophy of the kind I hope to undertake here is therefore necessary, even
in matters like these. It does matter to our own lives and to the lives of others the
philosophical lenses through which we view the world; these determine which actions we
take and how. The undemocratic sleight of hand that the utilitarian leaders of Effective
Altruism are attempting here - “these issues are very important, you admit, therefore, yield
the ethical realm of determining what the “right” way of addressing them is to us, the ethical
experts. Do as we say, and using our methods. We (and QALYs) know better” - this assertion

44

See: Wolf, Susan. 1982. “Moral Saints”. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 8 (Aug., 1982), pp.
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of objectivity, which has deep implications to our lives as well as to the lives of those we
seek to aid, cannot simply be accepted just because the issues we are thinking about are so
serious.

My hope is therefore that a close reading of pragmatist philosophy, by offering a
mode of orientation, a methodological maxim based on actual consequences (“Consider what
effects, that might have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.
Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object”45), will help
us with exploring how we can both maintain a democratic conception of ethical good that
acknowledges contingencies, and still hope to address pertinent problems in the world today.

(The second part of this essay delves deeply into the claims made by the effective altruism
movement, and discusses what I think is wrong with the movement)
Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1878. “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”. Popular Science Monthly, Volume
12, 1878. This is commonly known as the “pragmatic maxim”.
45
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PART TWO:
SHALL WE LEAVE IT TO THE EXPERTS?

It is so easy for the good and powerful to think that they can rise by following the
dictates of conscience, by pursuing their own ideals, that they are prone to leave those ideals
unconnected with the consent of their fellow-men
Jane Addams

Martha Nussbaum’s review46 of Peter Unger’s book47 is strongly disapproving.
Unger’s argument, in line with Peter Singer’s famous essay48, Famine, Affluence and
Morality, concerns the notion that affluent people, especially in western countries, are
culpable in increased human misery. The key reason for this claim, for Unger as well as for
Singer, is a distinction that many affluent people seem to have made between causing harm
and allowing harm to occur. Unger argues that this distinction is irrelevant, and in typical
consequentialist fashion, that what matters is that harm occurs - and those who allow it to
occur are not in any way less morally culpable than those who commit it.

46

Nussbaum, Martha. (1996). “If Oxfam Ran the World”. Published in “Philosophical Interventions:
Reviews 1986 - 2011”.
47

Unger, Peter. (1996). “Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence”. Oxford University
Press.
48
Singer, Peter. (1972). “Famine, Affluence and Morality”. Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 1, No.3.
(Spring 1972). 229 - 243.

May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania
30

Unger gives here Singer’s famous example of a child drowning in a pond to illustrate
his point49. We are morally obligated to save the child, he affirms, so long as doing so does
not cause us anything morally comparable. And we are morally obligated to do so even if
other people around us are not doing so. Therefore, drawing the analogy back to global
poverty and deprivation, affluent people have a moral duty to mitigate the harm and suffering
caused by global deprivation. To this effect, Unger argues that an affluent person “like you
and me, must contribute to vitally effective groups, like Oxfam and Unicef, most of the
money and property she now has, and most of what comes her way for the foreseeable
future”50

Unger’s account is already a difficult one on its own merits, for it is one whose
intuitive appeal is shared usually by only consequentialists, and not by adherents to many
other philosophical schools. One could simply deny the charge that causing harm is morally
equivalent to allowing harm to occur51. And having rejected this basic premise, it is difficult
to see how the consequentialist would proceed. But Nussbaum further misrepresents -or

49

In Singer’s famous thought experiment, one is headed towards something important, say, a job - or
to give a lecture. On the way there, one sees a child drowning in a pond. If one jumps and saves the
drowning child, one will run into several inconveniences: one might be late to work or lecture, one
might ruin one’s expensive clothing etc. Singer then asks, would one jump in to save the child despite
knowing that one would ruin one’s clothing? Most people answer, yes. Singer then asks a follow up
question: Would one fail to jump into the pond - and thereby let the child die - simply because other
people around were not jumping in to save the child? - Most people, from intuition, say, no. Here,
Singer draws out a principle that he thinks underlies these intuitions. We think it is morally wrong, he
affirms, to let someone die if we can do something to save them without sacrificing something morally
comparable (as in the clothes, or being late for work), and we think this still holds even if other people
are not doing anything to save them. Singer then extends this to discuss our obligations concerning
moral beneficence.
50

Quote lifted from Nussbaum’s review and not from Unger.
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The only way to deny this is by an appeal to intuition, but I believe that the only way to assert it is
also by appealing to shared intuition.
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misunderstands- Unger’s argument, constructing a hypothetical dystopia - a morally
diminished world where Unger’s suggestion is taken literally, and therefore charity
organizations like OXFAM and UNICEF run the world. This, for her, means that democracy
would be threatened, that “poverty and misery would almost certainly get much worse, as
global health efforts fell into disarray, as the “green revolution” stalled for lack of intellectual
input, and as debates about different types of economic organisation languished for lack of
financial support”.52

In providing this argument, Nussbaum ignores the obvious implication of Unger’s
argument, which Peter Singer (and Unger himself) points out in the comments section of her
piece: that since what Unger aims to do is to change the contingent world, the world to which
he aims is not a world in which his philosophy is necessary. Which is to say, that if enough
people donated to these “effective organizations” such that they could better tackle and solve
the problems we consider pertinent, then there would be no need for other people to keep
donating53, there would be no breakdown in global institutions or movements - neither
OXFAM nor UNICEF would rule the world. Thus Nussbaum’s apocalyptic prophecies are
mostly irrelevant, for Unger’s argument is predicated on contingency, on the fact that not
everyone is going to take his recommendation.

Of course Nussbaum’s contention should not be thrown off so lightly. She is an
institutionalist, and she justifiably wonders what would happen in a world where these aid

52

Ibid 48

53

Unless of course one subscribes to the defeatist belief that the world’s problems are unsolvable or
cannot be tacked at all given our resources, which neither Unger nor Nussbaum does.
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organizations had become so powerful but no longer necessary. Would we simply disband
them? Would they allow that? Important as these questions she asks are, they are speculative
in a way that is not helpful for guiding practical action in the contingent world. The only time
we could know whether it was possible to disband a future very powerful OXFAM would be
in the future when OXFAM was already powerful and needed disbanding.

Moral Imbeciles and “Impact”

But Nussbaum gets many other things right. Unger’s book is a direct ideological
predecessor of the current Effective Altruism movement, and in her criticism of Unger,
Nussbaum, in her typical incisiveness, points out another facet of Unger’s work, which it
shares with Effective Altruism, and which is critical to my project here: the audience of
Unger’s book.

She notes:

“His implied reader is a moral imbecile, an affluent person who repeatedly tosses
appeals from charitable organisations into the wastepaper basket and heedlessly goes on
living the high life. This imbecile is not already thinking about how to do good, and can be
reached only by being bullied and hectored. Unger keeps giving us phone numbers and
addresses of charities, on the apparent ( p.190) assumption that we don’t know how to find
them for ourselves. His sentences are full of slogans and capital letters (the View that Ethics
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is Highly Demanding, or Pretty Cheaply Lessening Early Death). He writes as if trying to
speak to someone who is not only obtuse but deaf. Even his examples presuppose moral
heedlessness”54

Indeed, according to the leaders of Effective Altruism, even though they themselves
are utilitarian, one need not be utilitarian to be an Effective Altruist. In fact, one need not
subscribe to any philosophical school of thought at all. All one need be interested in, is how
to do good, and Effective Altruism will show you how to “do good better” - Much like what
Nussbaum is accusing Unger of doing in the paragraph above. Which is to say, you don’t
have to be a utilitarian if all that is required of you is to do what the utilitarians tell you.

The idea put forward by the Effective Altruists then, to support Unger’s claim
regarding our moral duty to donate, is that people living in the west55, at this moment in time,
are at the “top of the heap”. “If you earn more than $52,000 per year, then, speaking globally,
you are the one percent. If you earn at least $28,000 […] you are in the richest five percent of
the world’s population”56. This remarkable ‘fortune’ (of being at the top of the heap) should
not be wasted. It is our greatest tool; for because we are so rich, “the amount by which we
can benefit others is vastly greater than the amount by which we can benefit ourselves”57.

54

Ibid 48

typically countries mainly composed of people of European descent, who claim a shared intellectual
and cultural community deriving from ancient Greece and Rome.
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56

Doing good better, pg. 18.
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Will MacAskill, the movement’s figurehead, cites studies of subjective well being by
two very respected economists that analyze the relationship between income and well-being.
The relationship, the economists find, is “roughly log-linear”: subjective well-being increases
as income increases, and if at all there is a “satiation” point when this is no longer the case,
most of the world is yet to reach this point. The corollary here is that the subjective benefit
somebody in the west gets from having their salary doubled is the same that anybody,
anywhere, gets from having their own salaries doubled58.

The implications of this are astounding to those who, like myself, had never thought
of them before. Based on the average (in 2015) American wage of $28,000 p.a and the
average Indian wage (also in 2015) of $22059, it would take another $28,000 - thus an annual
salary of $56,000, for the average American to be twice as happy. It would only take an
additional $220 - thus an annual income of $440, for the average Indian to be as happy.

From this, comes the Effective Altruist’s “100* Multiplier” : the American is many
times over more privileged than the Indian, so if one (an American/ Westerner) is an effective
altruist, then they should expect to do at least 100 times as much to benefit other people as
they can to benefit themselves. The idea is to maximize this “impact”. Sure, a normal
effective altruist on a normal American wage, with just a few adjustments in living style, can
save 100 people ( in a lifetime) - or do 100 times the equivalent of the good he could have
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Stevenson, Betsey, & Wolfers, Justin. (2013). “Subjective Well-Being and Income: Is there any
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done for himself. But most of the people MacAskill is talking to are not “normal Americans”
with normal American earning potentials; they are brilliant students and professors at
prestigious educational institutions who have the capacity to earn more than four or five
terms the wages of the normal American.

This maximization principle goes not just for donations that we ourselves give. It also
goes for the kinds of careers we choose. Don’t be a philosopher; be a banker. Don’t be a
political scientist; be a politician. MacAskill entreats us to think “marginally” and
“counterfactually” about these.

Here’s how to think marginally: Why do New York City transit workers earn more
($77,991 p.a) than New York City teachers ($68, 151 p.a)? Presumably, teachers’ effect on
society is more than that of city transit workers - for teachers affect the fundamental rubric of
our societies, determining what kinds of adult human beings ed up existing and making
decisions about important stuff. There are also more teachers than there are city transit
workers, so ideally one would expect that teachers - say if they unionized - would have
greater bargaining power than city transit workers.

However, the results play out counterintuitively. If city transit workers went on strike
today, the effects would be much worse than if teachers went on strike. Children missing a
few days of school is, it seems, a more preferable consequence when compared to a city
whose garbage has not been collected, whose toilets have not been washed, and whose public
transport systems have not been functioning, for a few days.
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The city could thus always use another city transit worker, for the fact that they are so
few in number makes each of them very important. The city will, however, be fine if ten, or a
hundred, more teachers are not added to its ranks; partly because public education is just not
a priority in America right now, and partly because those posts will be easily filled with
young graduates, eager to work for Teach for America and such other programs. So while the
total value of teachers to society outweighs that of city transit workers, transit workers have a
much higher marginal v alue.

In a similar thought process, (MacAskill’s example), if one wants to be a doctor, then
one ought be a doctor in a developing country, where one is really needed - and thus has
much higher marginal value, and where one’s impact would be much larger (one would then
do 100 times more good) than if one were a doctor in a developed country, where the supply
for doctor far outstrips the needs of the populace, and the good one would do would be much
less (measured in QALYs).

And here’s how to think counterfactually: What if, before signing up to do medicine
in the first place, one evaluated the expected good from the occupation of being a doctor vis a
vis other occupations? One QALY represents a year lived in perfect health. As a doctor in a
developing country, one would save, say, 300 lives (10950 QALYs - assuming an additional
life span in perfect health of 36.5 years i.e. 36.5 QALYs per life on average) over a career
spanning 40 years60. But if one did not take up the doctor’s job, someone else would step
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Statistic derived from Srinivasa.
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right in (MacAskill refers to this as replaceability). There is, he thinks, no shortage of
well-intentioned people -including doctors - seeking to help others in need.

The alternative: In 2017, the starting salary of a first year lawyer at New York Law
Firm Cravath, Swaine and Moore was $ 190,000, with bonuses of $5,000. This went up
yearly, with seventh year associates earning base salaries of $340,000 and bonuses of
$25,00061. If, over a forty year career, one worked at a law firm such as Cravath, and one
donated, say, 50,000 for the first few years, increasing it progressively as one climbed up the
ranks to when, say, one is a senior partner earning roughly $2,000,000 p.a., and donating say,
half of this for the last ten years of their career, one would have donated roughly $15,000,000
by the time they retire. A donation of $3400 to the Against Malaria Foundation, by
MacAskill’s estimates, would save one life. That means $15,000,000 would save roughly
4412 lives. At the rate of 36.5 QALYs per life, why, that would be a whooping 161,038
QALYs!

The task is thus set for the effective altruist: thinking marginally and counterfactually
tells us that what you should do is put yourself in a position where you can earn as much as
you can, then give as much as you can - maximize, be efficient. There is intense thought
applied to the calculations detailed above. Yet one cannot help thinking that there is a certain
thoughtlessness to them as well, particularly that of the person choosing the career - the one
being entreated to earn to give. For example, for some years, the 80,000 hours website
recommended investment banking as a career choice with immense donating potential,
61
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sometimes outright denying that any form of earning to give caused more harm than good62 63
. However, calculations were later done. It was “shown” that going into investment banking
actually did cause harm.

Amia Srinivasan notes:

“MacAskill says he no longer recommends that people go into banking, or at least not
the parts of it that he thinks cause direct harm: creating risks that will be borne by
unsuspecting taxpayers, or selling products that no properly informed person would buy.
Instead 80,000 Hours now encourages people to take what it sees as morally neutral or
positive jobs: quantitative hedge-fund trading, management consulting, technology start-ups.
(You can take a careers quiz on the 80,000 Hours website; I was told to become a consultant,
because of its earning-to-give potential and the general business education it provides. When
I changed my answers to say that I was bad at maths I was told to go into politics.)”64

What follows? Ideally, the many effective altruists who had gone into investment
banking quit this “morally controversial” career, and pursue those other morally ‘neutral’ or
‘positive’ careers, for example those listed above - management consulting, technology
start-ups, etc. But now that McKinsey, perhaps the world’s top consulting company, has been
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shown to cooperate with authoritarian leaders who persecute ethnic minorities65, and has even
been shown to have helped in providing information on critics who criticize these
governments66 - information which then led to the death of said critics; and now that tech
companies such as Facebook have been shown, among other things, to have increased levels
of social anxiety among users, and to have grossly mishandled user-data, both leading to
pernicious consequences, not least of which was influencing the outcome of an American
election, and with it the lives of quite literally everyone in the globe, is it perhaps time to
recalculate?

It is this thoughtlessness of the typical effective altruist, and the consequent amount of
moral decision-making that then becomes the purview of moral “experts” like MacAskill,
that worries. (S)he - the effective altruist- is given respite from actual thinking; from
personally wrestling with difficult decisions of what most of us consider genuine moral
conundrums, and of the practicable consequences of her decisions - so long as, in general,
they are seen to generate more QALYs. Instead, these decisions are relegated to the utilitarian
experts, who then “objectively” assess them in a bid to maximize QALYs, and when their
measurements are found wanting (as with the investment banking case), then the effective
altruists simply make adjustments, and move on to whatever new recommendation is to be
given; whatever maximizes QALYs at this moment.

https://www.businessinsider.com/mckinsey-china-uighur-corporate-retreat-china2018-12
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/world/asia/mckinsey-china-russia.html
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Of course, one could think of this as pragmatically learning from mistakes - they
thought investment banking was good, they realized it wasn’t, they updated. But this
learning, from the pragmatic point of view, is in many ways flawed because it holds as its
teleology what it considers an objective good; it does not so much pay heed to what
practicable results may be preferable, and for whom. And it does not recognize that what are
to be considered preferable outcomes are contingent, and differ from group to group. Rather,
it is simply interested in achieving its priorly stated objective end, in QALYs. It is not a
learning that recognizes the messiness of the world, and that therefore necessarily includes
democracy in determining value, but one that seeks to fine-tune a system - in a sense, to
exchange democracy for objectivity; so that those who participate in it can go about with
their lives with as little moral thinking as possible.

The insistence on maximization and effectivity, at every turn, recalls Sidgwick’s
“point of view of the universe”. Good can only be maximized fairly if no one has any direct
stakes (except in good qua good). Democracy is thus a second order priority here; one only
incidentally sought out. Sure, maximization of QALYs might usually go hand in hand with
democratic values, but whenever these two don’t go together, the actions of the Effective
Altruists seem to suggest: Let us serve a higher imperative than democracy - objectivity.

Through all these attempts at Sidgwick-ian objectivity however, we witness that even
for the utilitarian “moral experts”, the messiness of the world asserts itself. The failures in
prediction of the calculations of the effective altruists signify the inherent inability of the
world to be understood and mastered entirely through models or moral theorization. At every
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turn, we are brought back to understandings of the world which some of us view as common
sense, due to membership of our respective communities, and which some of us reject, also
due to being members of particular communities. The resolution to these differences in
views, if there is one, is necessarily political. Some of us think prisons need to be abolished;
some think prisons are absolutely necessary for a well-functioning democratic society. Some
of us think sweatshops are abominable, some (including the effective altruists67) think that
there is a moral case to be made for sweatshops.

After all of that has been said, we realize that if there is an argument that will change
our minds and compel us to adopt a new position over the one we previously did, it will not
be a calculation showing what generates more QALYs; for not only do we disagree on
whether some things can be compared or quantified in the first place, but even when we do
decide to compare some things, we find it impossible to agree on what value to attach to each
of them. How many people are you willing to see die before you can sacrifice your child? - It
is a silly question, yet it is questions of this sort that the sort of emphasis on maximization
that effective altruism - and utilitarianism, broadly construed, - champions, compels us to ask.

And even when we have statistics, what data we view as relevant is, I argue, in the
first place determined by our points of view (i.e. communities of belonging) that we already
had before we came into contact with the data. This is the essence of what William James
called the “Will to Believe”68 - that the evidence of whether certain beliefs are to be
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Doing Good Better, pg. 131. “Because sweatshops are good for poor countries. If we boycott them
we make people in poor countries worse off”.
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James, William. (1896). “The Will to Believe”. In perhaps his most famous article, James took to
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considered true or false hinges, first and foremost, on those beliefs being taken up without
evidence, in the traditional sense.

What might change our minds, if they will be changed at all, will be to be convinced
to adopt what Richard Rorty termed the “language”69 of our interlocutors - to join their
community of intersubjective agreement, through a process he called “humiliation”. It will be
to be convinced that our interlocutor’s point of view is “right” because we think it presents
the best practicable outcomes for the broadest range of what is considered “us”.

And even in pursuing this agreed upon “right”, we will have no choice but to
acknowledge that we might be wrong i.e. that the outcomes of our choices might not yield
desirable practicable consequences. As Srinivasa notes, “effective altruists … ” despite their
claims to suppossed objectivity, “like everyone else who wants to make the world better,
must do what strikes them as best, without any final sense of what that might be, or any
guarantee that they are getting it right”70.

We are thus here led to see the futility of “moral experts” such as the effective
altruism leaders - and the undesirable consequences of creating “moral imbeciles”. If there
were a possibility that they (the moral experts) could be “objectively” right with respect to
of beliefs - hypothesis venturing, and self-fulfilling, where it was rational to believe without evidence. In
the first case, think of when a scientist deeply has a hunch about something - without the evidence for
it, and goes about proving it, until she finds the evidence. And in the second case, think of the famous
doctrine of double determination in Homeric Epic, whereby the hero, by believing that he was under
the influence of a God, went on to accomplish much greater feats in battle than he would have had he
not had this belief.
69
70

Rorty, Richard. (1989) “The Contingency of Language” in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity.
Ibid 63
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some objective teleology, if this whole life thing was just a series of calculations, then there
would be use for them. But as I have been arguing, in the absence of this overriding
objectivity, what’s left is all of us stumbling around - and the only way to make this
stumbling more bearable for everyone; the only way to produce the most preferable results
for the broadest “us”, is to seek the broadest agreement on how to best stumble together.

Democratic experience is thus what is most fundamental here, and this is exactly what
is lost when moral imbeciles are created, moral imbeciles who, as Jane Addams notes, pursue
their own ideals, leaving those ideals unconnected with the concerns of their fellow man. By
positing maximization as the objective standard, the effective altruists promote Nussbaum’s
“moral heedlessness” by those who are keen to maximize their “impact” yet are unwilling to
confront the messiness of the world - and all the bad practicable results that this sort of moral
heedlessness brings about.

The Markets. The Markets! ...And Structural Reform

This moral heedlessness, leftist critics of Effective Altruism have argued, shores up
oppressive superstructures (particularly market capitalism) - superstructures which are
themselves the causes of the problems that Effective Altruism seeks to fix. By focusing
entirely on the market as what is capable of solving the pressing problems we face, Effective
altruist do not question their roles and positions within this market, and what this continued
participation in the market means for those they are trying to help.
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Influential thinkers such as Mike Davis71 and the earlier72 Amartya Sen73 74, for
example, have written on how markets are complicit in causing human deprivation and
suffering. For the Effective Altruists however, the insistence on markets arises from the belief
that, on average, markets do more good than harm. Effective altruists are not against
anti-market schools of thought per se, they are pro whatever is efficient and maximizes
QALYs - it just happens that right now, it is market capitalism that does that. Does the “free”
market have problems? Sure, they agree. But as long as no feasible alternative is available,
the effective altruists prefer to work within it, for as of now, it is what produces “the most
good”.

Critics however point out that Effective Altruism’s strategy - and that of charity in
general - is one where three relations exist: the donor, the aid agency, and the person to be
saved. All these relations are mediated by the market, which determines the costs of life
necessities that the person to be saved requires. This is to say, if the donor does not transfer
the money to the aid agency, then the person to be saved perishes. This market logic holds for
more than just donations: Effective altruism also argues for things such as sweatshops using
it.
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“Those who protest sweatshops” , they contend, “by refusing to buy the goods
produced in them, are making the mistake of failing to consider what would happen
otherwise…(Here’s the counterfactual again) In poor countries, sweatshop jobs are the good
jobs. Because sweatshops are good for poor countries, if we boycott them we make people in
poor countries worse off”75.

And when speaking about climate change: while cutting down our consumption of
meat and dairy products, reducing our travel, and being more mindful of the amounts of
water, gas and electricity we consume in our homes are all fine and dandy, what the effective
altruists think really works is called “offsetting”. What this means is that rather than reducing
one’s own greenhouse emissions, one instead pays “for projects that reduce or avoid
greenhouse gas emissions elsewhere”76. The QALYs show these are the most effective
approaches.

This entrenched focus on the market as the harbinger of solutions entirely ignores the
systems that produces the problems to be fixed in the first place. If we are to take Sen’s and
Davis’ criticisms seriously, then we are, it seems, being forced to play the charade of paying
“the market” what it demands so it can solve the problems it had a large part in creating.

Effective Altruism, in this sense, aside from its promotion of the above mentioned
heedlessness, does not historicize. There is no thought paid to systems like colonization,

75
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economic exploitation, market-instigated gender discrimination etc. that led to the problems it
is trying to fix. It does not speak of how people in the west came to be in a position to “save
the world” in the first place. It is apolitical to the core. Instead, the moral guilt (for the
suffering of others, as in Unger’s example at the beginning of part 2) is directed at
individuals, and in the same way, the responsibility for fixing these problems is also so
piecemeal-ly affixed.

Michael Snow notes:

“If we look at the institutions that make and allocate the resources others so
desperately need, we must ask whether it is wrong to withhold these resources from others for
the sake of payment and profit. Doing so not only seems morally reprehensible, it is morally
reprehensible for precisely the same reasons effective altruists argue it is wrong not to
donate money to charities: it is wrong to value some small sum of money (or what it might
buy) over a human life or a minimum standard of living” 77

It is therefore not shocking that the world’s capitalist elite prefers the kind of
philanthropy advocated by effective altruism, and other kinds of atomized, non-political ways
of dealing with the structural issues effective altruism aims to tackle, as opposed to methods
that are political and systematic. As Anand Giridharadas notes, this is the typical case where
the people who will most lose if actual social change occurs place themselves at the forefront
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of leading said social change78 - i.e. by making sure it does not happen in the first place, or, at
the very least, not in ways that threaten them. For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, a foundation run by the second richest person in the world, has expressed strong
approval for MacAskill’s work on Effective Altruism79 and its modus operandi; Michael Dell,
the billionaire founder of the eponymous Dell Computers, argued against a tax hike for those
earning above $10,000,000 so as to address pertinent structural issues, saying that private
foundations were much better suited at allocating funds and dealing with societal problems
than were governments80.

But even more, Effective altruism’s strange relation to the market is also, for the
morally heedless person, touted as a way to achieve self worth and a stable sense of self in a
consumerist world in shambles.

Peter Singer says:

“The hedonic hamster wheel of a consumer lifestyle: You work hard to get money.
You spend that money on consumer goods which you hope you will enjoy using. Then the
money is gone. You have to work hard to get more and spend more to maintain the same level

Giridharadas, Anand. (2018). Winner Takes All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World. Alfred A.
Knopf Books.
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of happiness. You never get off the hamster wheel, and you never really feel satisfied. You
become spiritually exhausted and wonder if your life is worth living. Becoming an effective
altruist gives you that meaning and fulfillment. It enables you to have a solid basis for
self-esteem on which you can feel your life is really worth living.”81

This feel-good guide, which recommends individual donating action as what brings
about meaning and fulfillment in life, depicts a lack of what C. Wright Mills called a
“Sociological Imagination”82 - that personal experiences are inextricably interconnected with
public issues. Just like the issues that the effective altruists are trying to chip away at poverty, racial and gender discrimination, etc. are structural, so too the source of this lack of
personal fulfillment, one with Mills’ sociological imagination would argue, are structural.
What is needed, for both the ills that effective altruism tries to work on, and for a
“solid basis for self esteem”, as they call it, i.e. for a turn from moral heedlessness, is
structural reform and deeper community engagement. To remove oneself from a
“consumerist” lifestyle while continuing to contribute to the structures that make it possible
in the first place is farcical.

But the Effective Altruists have answers to these charges that they neglect systemic
political change in exchange for atomized market action. First, they argue that “Effective
Altruists love systemic change”83. They provide a list of initiatives to show this. This list
81
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includes their open philanthropy project84- whose mission it is “to give as effectively as we
can and share our findings openly so that anyone can build on our work”, the Open Borders
project85 - which seeks to address issues of immigration, especially as pertaining to the United
States but also related to the broader refugee crisis, and finally, GiveWell86 - which seeks to
transform attitudes towards giving.

Secondly, the effective altruists give the argument provided in reply to Nussbaum’s
contention (at the beginning of this second part of the essay- and also alluded to at the
beginning of this section on markets). They argue that of course, systems are important, but
that while the systems do not yet exist, they are much more concerned with what individual
actors can do to address contingent problems in the meantime. In fact, they argue that
sometimes these individual actions chip away at systems and lead - eventually - to the
bettering of these systems, such that they are no longer seen as morally nefarious. Supporting
sweatshops, for example, provides the best available option for workers in poor countries.
Effective Altruists tacitly invoke modernization theory, typically used in international
relations theory here: sweatshops are an inherent part of development, and as more
sweatshops arise, more alternatives are available to workers. This increases their (workers’)
bargaining power to such an extent that the resulting working conditions and wages are not
exploitative anymore87. The market eventually stabilizes itself- just look at China!
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On the first of their replies: perhaps we disagree on what “systemic change” means.
For most people, organizations - the kinds that the effective altruists mention, are a necessary
precondition to systemic change. But they are not sufficient. What matters more than just the
existence of organizations doing something, is the issues that those organizations concern
themselves with - and typically, these are issues structural social, political and economic,
usually created and maintained by markets and political structures.

Even more importantly, what matters is the potential political efficacy of those
organizations - and this efficacy requires democracy and political solidarity for it to be
attained. Addressing these requires political organizing and lobbying, mass action, and the
democratic inclusion of the broadest swathes of people potentially affected, and those
together in solidarity, in discussing, planning, and carrying out whatever actions are agreed
upon democratically. For most of us, systemic change does not consist in telling rich and
middle class western people where to best donate, as GiveWell, one of their examples of
“systemic change” - does. So if the initiatives outlined above are their example of systemic
change, I simply deny the charge that effective altruists love s ystemic change.

One the second answer: while the contention provided here - that of addressing
contingent problems while the systems are still absent- works well against Nussbaum’s
dystopian visions, it does not do so well against the challenge of the leftists. The leftists
contend that it is a zero-sum affair: the atomization that effective altruism, by concentrating
on individuals, promotes, is actually detrimental to structural organizing. Paul Bamberg
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argues that the kind of activity the effective altruists are engaged in promotes “political
quietism”88- which is a similar charge to Nussbaum’s heedlessness.

In effect, some leftists, in a bid to show that this argument from contingency does not
hold here, call into question89 Singer’s analogy of the child drowning in the pond that Unger and the effective altruists- make use of. In Singer’s case of the drowning child, the beauty of
the thought experiment is its simplicity. It does not matter that there are other children
drowning elsewhere, or that the city council should have built fences to ensure that children
do no fall into muddy ponds and drown. The fact of the matter is that I am here, and I can
save this d rowning child. Should I refuse to do so because I would rather be pursuing
systematic change? No. In the same way, there are people dying right now - and these deaths
are preventable. The Effective Altruists ask: are we going to let them die simply because we
are intent on pursuing systematic change?

But this - the shift from the case of the child, to that of market-caused problems, is a
disanalogy. It is not that the child has fallen into the pond and we must save him; it is, as
Snow notes, that capital has pushed the child into the pond (in this case, by causing famines,
for example, or by continued global trade and finance policies that continue to disenfranchise
“third world” countries), and it then requires that we pay it what it demands so it can save the
child. The needs of the people effective altruism concerns itself with are life-sustaining: food,
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medical attention, better working conditions; and the resources to address these needs do
indeed exist - as shown by the mere fact that they can be bought in the “free” market.

These needs can be structurally provided for through people-centered government
services, redress of historical wrongs, and projects like universal basic income (UBI),
progressive taxation, fairer trade policies, cracking down on corruption - particularly that
between western multinationals and “third world” governments, etc. These are fights that
require critical mass and political organization; that demand political will instead of
piecemeal donation, and fulfilling our moral quotas by donating, as effective altruism
recommends, much as this makes us feel good about ourselves and supposedly “gives us a
sense in purpose” as Singer argues, just will not do.

But even setting these objections aside, suppose that we provisionally decide to buy
into Effective Altruism’s argument of maximization and efficiency, the question then
becomes, is the “free” market really what is efficient and maximizing? Some people would
want to express uncertainty, and argue that we really cannot tell i.e. that we do not - cannot have sufficient data, that there are too many variables involved for us to be able to tell
conclusively on a global scale. Making such a claim, they think, would be to sacrifice nuance
at the feet of a principle of parsimony- and the problem with this, they think, is that the world
is simply not simple: sacrificing nuance renders the entire project useless. The unstated
premise here, of course, is that in the hypothetical that we could gather sufficient data, we
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could be able to conclusively tell whether the world had become better or worse as a
consequence of market capitalism90.

Others would like to think that the “facts” just don’t lie. They would point out how
many people have been “lifted out of poverty” since China opened itself to the “free market”,
and since the collapse of the Soviet Union made American-led liberal capitalism the
dominant political-economic superstructure91, 92. Others, of whom I am one, would point to a
different set of “facts”, to the damages instigated by markets: famines, economic exploitation
of some countries by others, climate change. In fact, they would argue that all the problems
that effective altruism is trying to address - including technological singularity - were directly
caused by the markets - which the effective altruists are now relying on to address these
issues.

There is no way to put a number to any of these views that will satisfy everyone
involved. It comes down to, as we pragmatists argue, expressions of community belonging.
The point here is that even when we accept (and remember, this is hypothetical acceptance)
the principal of maximization as a desired consequence, there are still no “objective” ways of
dealing with the problems we identify - of knowing what exactly maximizes - of agreeing on
what is to be maximized. Of course all these parties would want to say that their view coheres
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best with reality - but that just confirms the argument I am making here. We are, it seems,
still left at the feet of multiple versions of “common sense”; at the feet of contingency- what
sounds good to our community based on the values we think we have, on our shared
historical understanding, and our agreed upon ways of viewing the world.

Even here then, the best93 course of action is political and democratic - we are brought
back to stuttering convictions, and our best recourse is solidarity in attempting to combat the
challenges we face. A defense of the markets (based on its inherent preferability due to some
perceived objective correspondence with reality, when this preferability cannot be measured
or stated conclusively in the first place) renders effective altruists intellectually dishonest.
There is therefore a need by effective altruists to take these leftist critiques of the market
system seriously, and, as I have been arguing all along, to replace their ideas of objective
truths, one being the supposed efficacy of the market right now, with democratically agreed
upon preferable consequences.

`

The Best Causes // I am Me

93

My usage of the term “best” here is just another exemplum of how trapped within our language we
are. By “best”, I intend the term as a general flexible commendation for my own point of view - to
signify my (and my community’s) preference of it over other points of view. As Rorty argues, the terms
“true” (and “best”) mean the same in all cultures, just like the equally flexible terms “here”, “there”,
“good” and “bad”. But the identity of meaning is of course compatible with the diversity of difference,
and the diversity of procedures for assigning the terms”. So the pragmatist deems herself free to use
the terms as general forms of commendation - as everyone else does - and in particular to commend
her own views.
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You are taking a walk when you see a house on fire, and several people
outside it. You go to see what’s happening, as undoubtedly most people there have. When
you get there, you are told that there’s a child trapped inside the burning house. No one is
willing to go inside to save the child, much as they feel for him. It’s just too risky for their
own lives; the fire’s too strong.

You are of the same opinion, even though you are deeply saddened about the child
dying. But then you look up at the house, and on a window ledge in the second floor, you see
a beautiful Siamese cat trapped inside. Now, for whatever reason, you care very very deeply
about cats, and Siamese cats are just your favorite. There’s no way you’re letting this cat die.
You dash into the house, run past the child trapped on the first floor, straight to the second
floor where the cat is. You grab the beautiful creature, cradle it, and run back outside.
Luckily, neither of you is hurt. You are glad you have done something good, the beautiful cat
is safe. Pity about that boy though. The other people outside look at you. They are angry.
How dare you save the cat instead of the boy? “But at least I did something!” You shout.
“What did the rest of you do?”94, 95

The intuition this little story is trying to get at is contained in the following question:
Even though you did more than the other observers at the fire, is there reason to think that
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Thought experiment paraphrased- and slightly altered (examples), from Theron Pummer’s account.
In Pummer, Theron. (2016). “Whether and Where to Give”. Philosophy and Public Affairs. Volume 44,
Issue 1. Winter 2016. Pp. 75 - 95.
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put in whatever placeholder animal they deem necessary here; the intuition being targeted is the
same.
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you have done something morally wrong, that perhaps you are even more morally
reprehensible than they are, by saving the cat and not the boy?

Theron Pummer answers, “Yes”.

Here’s another one: It costs $42,000 to train a guide dog, thus, by proxy, $4200 per
year to provide “eyesight” for one blind person for ten years (assuming the average lifespan
of a guide dog to be ten years). The charity you donate to does not have overhead costs - or
these costs are taken care of by other donors, and you are assured that every cent of your
money will be used to train the dog. On the other hand, another charity, though using only
seventy percent of its donations (the rest of the funds being used for administrative purposes)
says it costs $35 to provide cataract surgeries for people in third world countries - in which
case a donation of $42,000 would mean you would provide eyesight for 840 people96. If you
choose to donate to the charity training dogs instead of the one providing cataract surgery,
have you done something morally wrong?

The Effective Altruists think so.

The principle the effective altruists are trying to establish here is that sometimes, we
can be fine with people not donating or not doing good, but that once one has decided to do
good, if they do not do the most good they could have done, then they have done something
morally wrong.
96
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Now here’s another one. Nick Bostrom works at the University of Oxford and directs
the Future of Humanity Institute (FHI)97. Bostrom’s work concerns the possibility of human
extinction, primarily extinction that comes about as a result of artificial intelligence (AI). The
probability of AI induced extinction is not high - it is quite low in fact. But were it to happen
(and this is probable, even if not likely, don’t forget), its consequences would be “near
infinitely bad”. Thus even the tiniest step to reduce this probability is “near infinitely
valuable”.

Bostrom says;

“If there is a one percent chance of this (extinction) happening, the expected value of
reducing an existential threat by a billionth of a billionth of one percent would be worth a
hundred billion times the value of a billion present day lives”98

Based on the principle outlined above - that if one has the opportunity to do good, and
one does not do the most good they can, then one has done something morally wrong - it thus
serves, for the effective altruists, that, in QALY terms - if we are to take Bostrom’s
calculation seriously, donating to artificial intelligence research trumps anything else. Despite
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the lower likelihood of an intelligence explosion, what we really s hould be directing most of
our energies towards is not global poverty and exploitation; not eradicating disease; not
discrimination based on race and/or gender or sexual orientation (even though, of course, we
should allocate whatever spare t ime and energy we have towards these).

No, it is artificial intelligence research. And since one accepted the maximization
argument in the first two cases (boy vs. cat in the burning house case, and the guard dog vs.
cataract surgery case), one must, logically, accept this one too! It is no wonder that, once
again, the world’s capitalist elite has jumped on this bandwagon. Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos,
Richard Branson et al. For all these rich men, the colonization of outer space to ‘save
humanity’ from possible extinction has become an agendum of the highest priority, and
Bostrom’s book, Superintelligence99, has been a lighthouse for them.

It is these strange analogical leaps that are troubling. Demandingness100 is often posed
as an objection -or support, depending on your school of thought- to utilitarianism. But the
demandingness objection rests on intuitions regarding actions that one deems supererogatory
- praiseworthy but not obligatory. As Pummer points out, both of the options are at first
seemingly supererogatory. No one compels, and not many people think it morally required,
for one to jump into the burning house to save the boy at risk of their own life in the first
case. And in the second case, donating itself is deemed supererogatory for most people
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(although of course some utilitarians argue that it is not), before one even decides whether to
donate to training the guard dog or to providing cataract surgery.

The catch comes once one recognizes another layer of demandingness. The Effective
Altruists contend that once one decides to perform an action, one is then morally required to
perform the best action of that kind. To not do “the most/best good”101 one can do then
becomes an avoidance of moral obligation, a moral transgression.

Many non-utilitarians reject this argument. As I have been arguing all through this
section, we do not want to be told what to care about just because it is what’s maximizing even though sometimes maximization may be a factor. And even though some maximizing
cases might augur with some of our intuitions - like the case with the boy vs. the cat and the
case with the cataracts vs. the guide dog - not all such cases strike our intuitions the same
way, especially not when they relate to us having to make a choice between something we
care about, and some other thing that is supposedly more important, but not as relevant to us,
or not of direct impact to our lives.

It is therefore not of much practical value to posit a principle that seemingly underlies
these cases as a logical imperative. We want to support cancer research because of contingent
reasons; because our grandparents died of cancer; even though we realize that Malaria is a
bigger killer disease. We fund cerebral palsy research centers because our kid suffers from
cerebral palsy, even while acknowledging that for humanity - considered abstractly, artificial
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intelligence research is perhaps more significant. At every turn, we are reminded of our
contingency: that most of the time, we care about things as they happen to us, we view
everything through our eyes and through the lenses of our e xperiences - experiences shaped
by communities of belonging, and personal and historical contingencies.

The idea I am reiterating here then is that while maximization can indeed be
something important, it is not the thing that overrides everything else in importance. It has to
compete with other facets of our lives as we experience and attach value to them. If,
therefore, philosophy is to succeed as an agent of social change, it must speak to our lives and
our experiences, to the ethical conflict that goes on in them; it cannot abstract from them by
presenting supposed objective logical principles that constitute moral imperatives.

Here, Bernard Williams102, that most sustained critic of utilitarianism, provides much
insight. Williams was primarily interested in the perspectives that actual human beings, living
through moral conundrums, had. His rejection of rule-based (primarily deontology) and
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It is of utmost necessity that I be careful to elucidate my usage of Williams here. Williams famously
argued (in Truth and Truthfulness, 2002) against some versions -the Rorty-ian kind - of the
conceptions of truth that I present here. He contended that human societies needed to think of both
truth and truthfulness as values, and, correspondingly, sincerity and accuracy as virtues that went
along with these values.
It seems to me that what Williams is doing, by positing Robert Nozick’s “potential explanations” of how
things/notions could have arisen, is simply seeking what Rorty terms a larger community of
agreement for what is practicable. I have no doubt that most who believe as Williams did will disagree
with me, but that’s another argument. Nevertheless, Williams deep recognition of the messiness of life
and his rejection of codified ethics; his belief that philosophy was something that accompanied life
itself, not replaced it or directed it abstractly, is something he shares with the pragmatists and differs
with the utilitarians on. I thus believe that a discussion of Williams’ ethics can be presented in support
of a largely pragmatist argument - even while recognizing the disagreements Williams had with the
pragmatists - without doing damage to Williams.
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end-based (primarily utilitarianism) philosophy was based on an interest in “life itself”. Life,
he thought, was not nearly as neat - or as boring - as moral philosophy made it out to be.

To attempt to understand Williams’ thought, it is necessary to historicize him - though
I of course risk barbarizing his thought in the process. But I will try my best.

Williams came of age as a philosopher at a time when Universal prescriptivism , first
introduced by R.M. Hare in his 1952 book - The Language of Morals103, (itself reeling under
the influence of the logical positivists) was hugely popular in moral thought in England. The
logical positivists, inspired by the earlier Wittgenstein in the Tractatus104, attempted to
scientize all activity that they thought was philosophical by maintaining that the only
meaningful statements were those which were verifiable - those that satisfied an empirical
criterion of meaningfulness. Einstein’s proposition about mass-energy equivalence was
meaningful because it could be verified: E =mc² held true empirically for every instance. The
same could not be said for “Thou shalt not commit adultery” or “Maximize utility”.

To express moral beliefs then, because they (moral beliefs) could not be empirically
verified, was merely to express certain attitudes - and therefore not at all a philosophical
activity. For example, for A.J. Ayer, one of the most prominent logical positivists, for me to
say “You were wrong in stealing that money” was nothing more than to express the
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proposition “You stole that money”105 - the “were wrong” expressing merely my attitude, and
providing no useful propositional content. From this, Hare’s universal prescriptivism came
up, as a grounding for a notion of morality that did not rely on verificationism.

Hare argued that moral utterances did not try to describe the world so much as they
tried to provide prescriptions - how it ought to be, and how one ought t o act in it. In the spirit
of Kant’s categorical imperative, Hare argued that the sort of prescriptions contained in moral
utterances were therefore universalizable. If I said one ought not steal, I meant that relevant
factors remaining the same, this imperative held for everyone. It is wrong for anyone to steal.

From this, the prescriptivists came up with a moral system, whose most important (at
least to me) facets that I hope to briefly discuss here were 1.) the impossibility of moral
conflict, and 2.) the idea that every obligation was but an instance of a more general
obligation, acceptance of the former naturally signifying an acceptance of the latter, and the
latter subsuming the former.

The first facet of the moral system that I point out posited that whenever two oughts
seemed to be in conflict, one of them was eliminable. This was because morality, for the
prescriptivists, was practical in a way that allowed only one course of action. If, for some
reason, two of my moral commitments were in conflict, I needed to simply deliberate again,
and upon doing so, would realize that one of them either was not truly a moral commitment,
or that it crumbled under the other.
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And here entered Williams.

Williams, in two articles106 107written in the mid 1960s, took this prescriptivist system
to task. In these articles, he argued not just for fragility - that luck and chance had some space
in our moral lives, but he also declared absurd the idea that moral commitments were
eliminable under one another. In a hearkening to Aristotle’s discussion of Akrasia108,
Williams points to the obvious existence of moral regret as evidence that moral claims did
not fold under one another. An example of this, provided by Martha Nussbaum in her first
book109, illustrates Williams’ point perfectly.

In the Iliad, Agamemnon, the leader of the Greeks, needs to go to war against the
Trojans. The Trojan Prince, Paris, has stolen Agamemnon’s brother’s (Menelaus) wife
(Helen), and Agamemnon, as the head of the family, needs to lead the war to save the
family’s kleos - honor. However, upon consulting the oracle at Delphi, Agamemnon is told
that the Greek ships will not sail unless he sacrifices his daughter, Iphigenia, to the Gods.

Agamemnon could certainly have gone the utilitarian way of calculating what
maximizes (and perhaps he did, for he killed his daughter and went to war). But in my view,
106
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and that of Williams and Nussbaum, Agamemnon was placed under a true moral conundrum.
This was a tragedy, and neither of the options could fold under the other; regret necessarily
followed whatever option he chose.

Either Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter - someone he loved and cared deeply for and an act that had grave consequences in itself; or he could not go to war, losing his family’s
kleos - the most important thing to a Greek, forever. It was cases like this that Williams used
to demonstrate the faults in the arguments of the prescriptivists. These cases showed, leaving
very little doubt, that the moral system the prescriptivists had come up with failed to
recognize this valid competition of demands, this fragility and presence of moral luck, within
people’s moral lives.

On the second mentioned facet of the prescriptivist moral system, Williams’ argument
brings us to perhaps the first sustained argument against demandingness. Williams thought
that this sleight of hand - of absorbing obligations under one another - would lead to a
situation where we were supposedly rationally compelled to hold views that we did not truly
hold. Within a systemic framework, a general obligation is of course derivable, as shown at
the beginning of this section with the discussion of maximization (boy vs cat, guide dog vs.
cataracts etc). You believe maximization should occur in this particular case, and in this one,
and in this one; therefore you hold maximization to be a general principle, of which the
particulars are instantiations.
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However for Williams, as for the pragmatists, who both rejected this idea of a
systemic morality, the idea that a general duty could derive from a particular one did not hold
- except perhaps trivially. Deriving such a general duty, for Williams, was an implausibly
demanding view of morality - and whereas the utilitarians thought (and think) that this view
outlined the extent of our moral commitments to us, bringing forth more stringent
imperatives, Williams simply thought we should do away with it. It was unrealistic.

Furthermore, the prescriptivists - as with the utilitarians - held fast to an impartial
account of morality, and this again, Williams thought, went against how life just was.
Working under their system, one had no special obligations to those closer to them - one’s
particular obligations were subsumed under the general one. I had no special particular
obligation that said, say, “save your sick child” that was not subsumed under the general
obligation “save sick children”.

In this schema, my child was just a child. Williams thought that this missed the point
completely. I wasn’t saving this child because it was my general obligation to save children. I
was saving this child because of the particular place she occupied in my life, as my child.
Moral obligations, Williams thought, could not exist over and above life itself, directing and
dictating what ought to happen.

This brief discussion of Williams’ ethical thought helps us put into perspective the
discussion on maximization that have dominated this section. Maximization implies
eliminibility. To have a moral imperative to do the “most good” implies that our other moral
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commitments fold under this maximizing principle - and it necessarily implies that we have
to be impartial. It is to further buy into the idea of particular obligations subsumed under
general ones; to say that we should donate to artificial intelligence research instead of cancer
research- despite the fact that our kid died from cancer - because that is what we ought to do,
what we are rationally compelled, by the principles we hold, to do. And the reason why this
is so is because having accepted the maximization rule with regards to the particular, we are
rationally compelled to accept it in the general as well, and to live correctly with regards to it.

But as Williams very persuasively argued, this just will not do. The idea of a moral
system, of rules and obligations that derive from it and contain imperatives, “deny - or at the
very least declare irrelevant, from the outset”, as Nakul Krishna puts it, “the fact that I am
me”110. Williams held that while, indeed, ethical life was important, it was not the sole
component to life, and certainly not the only one that had importance. Ethical considerations
had to accompany life, had to be a facet of it. Oughts could not be the lords that reigned
tyrannically over life - telling us what we, at pain of being illogical or ‘immoral’, were
rationally compelled to do. Maximization, the Effective Altruist instantiation of this - with its
dictates of what was objectively right, what we ought to do, despite our other commitments to
life, to family, to our own contingencies, should be rejected on the same grounds that
Williams rejected the prescriptivist moral systems, grounds that I have carefully outlined
above.
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(The third and final part of this essay will present a pragmatist reading of
beneficence. It will aim to detail how, in very hazy detail, our ethical lives may look like once
we accept the pragmatic view of epistemology (as against the utilitarian one) outlined in the
first part of the essay.)
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PART THREE:
DEMOCRATIC VISTAS

Democracy, and the one true good, are synonymous to me.
John Dewey

The pragmatist is one who turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal
solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended
absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards fats, towards
actions, and towards power. It means the open air and possibilities of nature as against
dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality.
William James

To attempt to attain a social morality without a basis of democratic experience
results in the loss of the only possible corrective and guide, and ends in an exaggerated
individual morality but not in social morality at all.
Jane Addams

“We have met the obligations of our family life, not because we had made resolutions
to that end, but spontaneously, because of a common fund of memories and affections, from
which the obligation naturally develops, and we see no other way in which to prepare
ourselves for the larger social duties." Such a demand is reasonable, for by our daily
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experience we have discovered that we cannot mechanically hold up a moral standard, then
jump at it in rare moments of exhilaration when we have the strength for it, but that even as
the ideal itself must be a rational development of life, so the strength to attain it must be
secured from interest in life itself”.
Jane Addams

It

is possible to cultivate the impulses of the benefactor until the power of attaining a simple

human relationship with the beneficiaries, that of frank equality with them, is gone, and there
is left no mutual interest in a common cause. To perform too many good deeds may be to lose
the power of recognizing good in others; to be too absorbed in carrying out a personal plan
of improvement may be to fail to catch the great moral lesson which our times offer.
Jane Addams
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Jane Addams’ Hull House in Chicago was an archetype of pragmatist social reform.
Addams practice was founded on what she called the “three R’s”111: 1.) Residence - that Hull
house was to work in concert with the local community whose problems it sought to address,
2.) Research - That there was to be in depth scientific study of the causes of poverty112 (in
West Chicago); on what the factors that engendered dependence and deprivation were, and
3.) Reform - That the results of these scientific studies were to be openly communicated to
the public, that public engagement and agreement had to be sought in figuring out the way
forward, and that active and persistent campaigns for legislative and social reform had to then
take place.

Addams, like Dewey, was a heavy believer in participatory democracy. Just like for
Dewey the town hall was the highlight of democratic life and the basis for social
reconstruction, so too, for Addams, a deep and enduring engagement with the community, a
firm belief that the community members had the biggest say in tackling what impacted them,
was the essence for social action.

Addams project was highly laudable (among many other achievements, with Dewey,
she helped found the American Civil Liberties Union, and she became the first American
woman to win the Nobel Prize, for, among other things, founding the field of Social Work as
we know it today). Yet to propose Addams’ kind of social reform, as I aim to do here, as a
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guideline for the sort of social reform and moral progress the Effective Altruists are engaged
in, seems laughable.

For one, the pragmatist conception of shared experience as the basis for intelligent
social deliberation and action (as demonstrated by the first R, residence) seems, prima facie,
incredibly parochial in geography, if not insular in the scope of the issues it concerns itself
with. Addams’ practice was focused entirely on the challenges facing particular immigrant
communities in the West Side of Chicago, whereas the concerns of Effective Altruism
transcend not just geography, but also species membership.

But I think this contention of parochialism is a misplaced worry. In response to it, I
argue here that “Residence”, for Addams, was a proxy for “community” - a term denoting the
scope of people, and the bases under which these people were afflicted by certain social
problems, and could therefore come together to create practicable solutions to these
problems. At the time Addams was doing her work, that community, for her, happened to be
European immigrants in the west side of Chicago, and the problems she was addressing were,
whilst indicative of larger social concerns113, particular to certain immigrant communities in
the West side.

Yet the idea of what is considered community does not need inherently to be confined
to physical residency within bounded atomized geographic areas for meaningful practicable
action to occur. Communities of belonging that people identify with, that attempt to define an
Which Addams did, in fact, address. See, for example, Democracy and Social Ethics (1927) , On
Education (2017), and her famous essay, “Utilization of Women in City Government”(1907).
113
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“us”, exist within and outside geographical boundaries - think the daughters of the American
revolution, people of African descent, the feminist movement, Black Lives Matter, the Ku
Klux Klan, etc. The challenge is simply to make them broader, and to provide bases for doing
so.

Perhaps then, before moving on, it would be useful to address exactly what kinds of
community, the bases, Addams thought these ideas referred to.

In just their bare stating, the three R’s seem to be value neutral: white nationalists, for
example, could come together to jointly address problems affecting them (residence); they
could conduct in-depth studies on how to tackle said problems - say, in-depth studies in
eugenics (research); and they could then put these ideas into practice to address whatever it is
they think is the problem- say, the extermination of non-white people among them (reform).
These three R’s must therefore, if we are to properly understand Addams’ thought, be
understood in conjunction with her ideas concerning social meliorism.

One of the advantages of living in defined societies of some sort (The United States,
western civilization etc.) is that the norms concerning ideas such as good and bad, moral and
immoral, have largely been passed down historically. This does not mean, at least in societies
that Popper termed “open”114, that debate and deliberation does not go on concerning these
ideas, or that such factors as fragility do not abound. Rather, it means that, by and large, the
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See, Popper, Karl. (1945). “The Open Society and its Enemies”. Routledge.
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nature of what is “moral” has entered the realm of public common sense, and has largely been
intertwined with the nature of practicable consequences.

Western notions of what was “moral” had moved through history - changing and
being altered to fit particular circumstances, and some remaining the same - from the ancient
Greeks and Romans, to the scholastics, through to the European enlightenment, and to us
today. Don’t kill people; do not steal; care *somewhat* about your neighbors.

The milieu Addams found herself during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, when she was most active, was dominated by this historical contingency. She was a
member of this community called “the west”, and this community had come to agree, mostly
with good reason derived from experience, that there were some states and conditions in the
world that were “good”, and some that were “bad” - and therefore could, or needed to, be
ameliorated.

In advocating for the three R’s then, Addams was in part influenced by these
historical contingencies - that there was some things we agreed to be bad or good due to
practicable consequences witnessed through historical experiences. Mass poverty was bad
and had bad practicable consequences; feeding people who did not have food was good and
had good practicable consequences. We were social beings steeped in history, and Addams
acknowledged that.
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On the other part, Addams was influenced by a pragmatist insistence on continued
experimentation, on the rejection of dogma. We had received a lot from history; but times
changed, and what provided the most preferred practicable consequences then, did not
necessarily do so now. Or the “us”, the community, affected by the consequences of some
action, had changed and/or broadened, and thus required that we re-evaluate our ideas
concerning what the best practicable consequences were - and for whom.

Agreements deriving from history thus had to be constantly questioned. Addams
balanced these two perspectives in her work. She was at once a prominent public intellectual
who debated the nature and value of our ideas concerning citizenship, gender equality, social
justice; and she was also a dedicated reformer who wrote books, lobbied, provided food and
counselling, to implement those things, as a public, we agreed were good, and to do away
with those we agreed were bad.

Her idea of community then, involved advancing these conceptions of good, and
doing away with those of bad, while constantly questioning what these terms meant within
our own historical and cultural contingencies. We had good reason to think that white
nationalists represented “bad”. And so for Addams, the three R’s were not neutral of value;
they were guidelines for communities in their attempts at moral progress, and moral progress
was defined, in the pragmatist way, as ever expanding solidarity based on agreed upon
practicable consequences.
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Rorty explained this idea of “ever expanding solidarity” best115. Rorty thought that
there were two frameworks which human beings, in an attempt to situate the “meaning” of
their individual existences within a wider world, relied on. The first one was, as discussed in
detail in sections above, objectivity - what philosophy had relied on since Plato. It involved
reference to a “non-human reality”, one entirely divorced of community, and accessible to
everyone so long as they possessed the necessary tools to access it (which, funnily for all its
allusions about truth and permanence, had changed through time - and once included divine
selection, but essentially, after the enlightenment, involved sensation, logic and reason).
Rorty called the believers of objectivity “realists”. Realists believe(d) that “truth” - an
immaterial category which corresponded with reality- was to be pursued for its own sake.
They believed in a metaphysics which distinguished true from false beliefs, and in
justificatory procedures not bound by communal attitudes; in procedures which were global
and natural.

The second way was to appeal to solidarity. It involved an individual “telling the story
of their identification” to a particular community - as mentioned above: western society, the
Daughters of the Confederacy, Feminists etc. These were the pragmatists.

Realists sought to reduce solidarity to objectivity; they sought to say that we agreed
on some things not because we simply agreed due to practicable consequences, but because
there were some objective, natural, and global facts that compelled us to do so. Pragmatists
on the other hand, sought to reduce objectivity to solidarity; to say that we were “nothing
115

Rorty, Richard. (1990). “Solidarity or Objectivity”. Published in Landesman, Charles & Meeks,
Robin (eds.) (2002). “Philosophical Skepticism”. John Wiley & Sons. Pp. 344 - 360.

May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania
76

more than our historical moment”, and that what human progress constituted was not in
“heading to a place which had been prepared for humanity in advance” (i.e. a telos), but
rather in the ability for all of “us” to “do more interesting things and be more interesting
people”116, and, in the same vein, to expand who “us” was, so these others too could do these
interesting things and be these interesting people.

My aim in this part of the essay therefore is to provide a way that we could put
forward the idea of moral progress -as Addams saw it with her three R’s- and human
responsibility to the broadest sense of what could be considered “us” - the notion of an
ever-broadening community, as Rorty outlined it, without grounding these in external
metaphysical and/or epistemological foundations which either ring hollow and do not provide
much basis for practicable action (e.g. telling a racist who already believed that he was better
than a black person, that he was objectively wrong, and expecting the racist, due to this
argument from objectivity, to then fundamentally alter his views and interactions with black
people), or are relativistic enough - and therefore so arbitrary, that they make meliorism
impossible in the world.

In the Addams and Dewey inspired view of community that I am presenting in this
third part of the essay then, our task of confronting the sorts of problems effective altruism
involves itself with lies in continually expanding the boundaries of who our “community” is Addams; first R, and then in applying Addams’ two other R’s in our meliorating work. We
form community when we stop cleaving to notions of objectivity. We then fundamentally
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Ibid 115, pg 352.
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change the ways we interact with others, both from our own intellectual and cultural
traditions, as well as from other backgrounds. When we conceive of (human) progress within
such a framework of solidarity; when democratic dialogue aimed at achieving solidarity
replaces quests for objectivity, then we stop being directed by a teleological place, or ideal
e.g. QALYs.

Instead we start to think of practicable results affecting members of our (ever
expanding) community as the basis for social action, action based on the the other two Rs research and reform. If we think of the values we share as members of a community as
having no external foundations except “shared social hope and the trust created by such
sharing”117, then our recourse is to reconfigure our actions so that, in the globalized
interconnected world we live in, where actions in one part of the globe affect others, we
reorient ourselves so that our task becomes figuring out how we can intentionally include (not
recognize) those others as members of our ever broadening community118, and then in
conducting research and enacting reforms which reflect this solidarity.

This notion of shared hope is grounded in experiences we are capable of having as
beings of particular biological kinds - relating to pain, pleasure, shared - and ever broadening-
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This is the reason why Dewey and Rorty were so keen on promoting liberalism. Both believed that
care - or friendship - could not be called upon spontaneously, as an intellectual demand. Rather, care
was cultivated by community. Yet it seemed implausible to think that one would think of every human
being - let alone every human being and animal, as part of one’s communities. Liberalism, they
thought, got around this, because a liberal community is defined necessarily by its openness to
others. When I declare myself a liberal qua Rorty or Dewey - or even Mill, I am saying that what
defines me is my toleration towards others and their ways of life (within the bounds of the harm
principle) - by definition, my bearing is open and welcoming to difference - and this is how Rorty
thought we could have an ever expanding community that we could attain solidarity with.
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understandings of humiliation etc (and thus this may broaden to include concerns about
animal welfare as well). The pragmatist yields to the fact that we are beings of particular
biological kinds, but, unlike the realist, he does not think that that tells us anything about
how, gives us reason why, we ought to be treated in particular ways, or what obligations we
are owed. “You have a heart or a mind” is not providing a reason as to why I shouldn’t stab
you.

Animals, possessed of similar biological capacities for pain as we humans, are, for
example, killed and mistreated everyday, and many people do not concern themselves much
with this, because we lack solidarity about what this means for our community. When those
of us who advocate that animals be not treated in such ways ground our reasons for doing so
on objectivity, then, as Rorty says, “ we leave ourselves open to the pointlessly skeptical
question "Is this solidarity real?" For some people will simply say, “I am not, objectively, like
these animals in these various ways”, or they will say that such a connection is trivial, and so
they do no see how this argument grounds a sense of obligation. The consequence then is that
“we leave ourselves open to Nietzsche's insinuation that the end of religion and metaphysics
should mean the end of our attempts not to be cruel.”119

On the other hand, a grounding on solidarity invites us to not have this Nietzschean
insinuation, for, from the outset, we do not operate with the notion of “realness” or of
objective likeness. Having solidarity as our grounding is to detail the experiences we have
had regarding these shared biological capacities - pain, pleasure, humiliation, and then

119

Rorty, CIS, Pg. 134

May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania
79

making conscious attempts to include others so that they share in the good practicable
outcomes, and avoid the bad ones. We have no non-circular ways to justify the values we
hold to be good - freedom of speech and toleration, the capability to love whoever one
chooses. We have no criterion except a detailing of the practicable consequences we have
seen occur, through history, when those values have been put in place, and an attempt to
convince others that these sorts of consequences are what are preferable.

My task here is therefore twofold: It is first to provide a basis for solidarity, for the
kind of global community which can stand in proxy for Addams’ first R. It is then, after that,
to show how this community might come together to achieve the other two R’s - research and
reform; how once we start thinking of other beings in various parts of the world as
constituting “us”, we can embark on a program of meliorism that is grounded in experience
and actual consequences, and that is not imposed but takes heed of democratic sentiment.

What is the proxy for the First R then?

Essentialism?… of some sort?

In this attempt to create a wider community, perhaps positing social hope, like I did
above, as the basis for solidarity brings questions of its own. The challenge here comes from
both the objectivists and the relativists. On the one hand, the objectivist wants to ask, isn’t
social hope just another proxy for something more objective, something like utility, that can
be measured and represented using QALYs?
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On the flip side, the relativists asks, why is social hope not just another arbitrary
categorization of what we (pragmatists) deem important as what defines our shared
community, and if so, what grounding does it have such that we should prefer it over other
arbitrary categorizations? Which is to say, why is social hope not as good as, or as bad as,
any other reason for justification? Why can’t the fact that we all have noses (the “we” here
being any being that possesses a nose), instead of the idea that we share social hope (based on
similar biological experiences relating to pain, pleasure and humiliation), be the metric under
which we form a community, and all unite to derive a sense of obligation to other beings?
And if it is this arbitrary, why don’t we then acknowledge that every way to live life is as
good as the other, and thus abandon the notion of trying to fit everyone into some program,
instead letting every community live as they please, constructing their own cultural
conceptions of meaning?

These two challenges are ones that the pragmatist wishes to avoid. She wants to
avoid, on the one hand, a supposedly objective, purely essentialist, conception of human
functioning that is so teleogized as to present us with the problems outlined in part two of this
essay. She rightly thinks these conceptions are wrong, for they are reductive in their attempts
at finding out that one thing - or set of things - that matter in human life - and then ordering
human action relative to them. She wants to avoid a situation where we take our cultural
position on some issue and impose it upon others as the objective, correct one, based on its
supposed correspondence to a certain reality. She thinks that such a program ignores
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democratic experience that is essential to achieving the preferable practicable consequences
she seeks.

On the other hand, she also wants to avoid the relativism that Bhimrao Ambedkar
called the “placid view of the anthropologist” - that “there is nothing to be said about the
beliefs, habits, morals and outlooks on life which obtain among the different peoples of the
world, except that they often differ”120. She wants to avoid these sorts of relativistic
conceptions because she thinks that they do not provide grounds for practicable action: how
do we do anything in the world if every point of view, every course of action, is the same as
the other? The defeatism of these relativistic views does not augur well with the meliorism
inherent in pragmatism.

Pragmatists want to say that there is such a thing as making the world better. They
only insist that “better” is a standard of democratic agreement about the value of shared
experience- not an objective fact nor an arbitrary standard.

In one attempt at tackling this issue, Martha Nussbaum121 puts forth a most eloquent
(non-pragmatist) conception of the human good; one which avoids both metaphysical realist
essentialism, and relativism122. Kant, Nussbaum thinks, struck the first nail in the coffin of
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Ambedkar, Bhimrao. (2016). “Annihilation of Caste”. Pg. 312. Verso Books.
Here again, as with Bernard Williams in the previous section, it is essential to note that Nussbaum
is an Aristotelian, not a pragmatist. Whenever there is a conflict between her views and those of the
pragmatists, I will be sure to point it out.
121

122

Nussbaum, Martha. (1992). “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian
Essentialism”. Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 202-246.

May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania
82

metaphysical realism (the kind espoused by the objectivists), and 20th century philosophers
of language and science such as Wittgenstein, W.V.O. Quine, Donald Davidson, and Nelson
Goodman, shut and buried that coffin123. These philosophers all argued, convincingly,
Nussbaum thinks, that the only defensible conceptions of truth and knowledge bound these
two notions inextricably with human cognitive activity within history. An attempt to provide
an unmediated essential account outside human cognition within history therefore, these
philosophers argued, was an absurd attempt that achieved nothing. “To cling to it (such an
account of essence) as a goal”, Nussbaum, in words very reflective of those of Bernard
Williams, holds, “is to pretend that it is possible to be told from outside what to be and what
to do, when in reality the only answers we can ever hope to have must come, in some
manner, from ourselves”124.

But Nussbaum’s greatest contention is with the relativists - most typified by French
academics enamoured by Derrida’s assault on the “metaphysics of presence”125. These
relativists hearken back to Ambedkar’s placid view of the anthropologist. They would

123
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In “Antwort der Frage, was ist der Aufklaerung”, as well as in his other more prominent works.
Ibid 117. Pg. 207.
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Derrida thought that philosophy, from Plato onwards, had fallen too far into the clutches of
metaphysics - a metaphysics which created a dualistic opposition - and privileged one part of this
duality over another, the common example being presence over absence. Here, Derrida borrows
heavily from Heidegger, who in Being and Time (1927) a
 rgued that we understood the beings of
entities - think time, beauty, etc. with respect to a definite mode of time - the present. Heidegger
thought that we has shifted our attention to the study of particular beings, thus avoiding the ontological
question of being itself - what is being? What does it mean to be? The result is that we forget to pay
attention to what brought the present about - to the absent. In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida
contends that the present is always compromised by a residue of previous experience - a residue that
can never allow us to be in a self-contained “now” moment. The recourse is that there can never be a
definite meaning to anything: anytime we try to pin down what something means in itself, the meaning
slips us in the now. In the context of the discussion above on relativism, what the French relativists do
is make use of Derrida’s metaphysics of presence to reject any sort of essentialism: whenever we try
to pin down anything as essential, they think, we are merely privileging the now, the present,, the
culturally closer, over the then, the absent, the far.
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contend, Nussbaum argues, that the introduction of the smallpox vaccine in India was a bad
thing, a case of western contamination of Indian values - for the introduction of this vaccine
apparently led to the eradication of the cult of Srilata Devi (even though the vaccine saved
millions of lives - but that’s a moot point).

And these relativists would contend, that India, unlike the west, experiences an
“embedded way of life” - where the same values that prevail at home prevail in the
workplace, and that this embedded way of life should not be disturbed by the imposition of
those dirty western values. An example of this embedded life that Nussbaum provides: A
menstruating woman is not allowed in the kitchen because she is believed to pollute it. So
too, in the workplace, where the looms are kept, she is not allowed in, because she is believed
to pollute the looms. What consistency.

Nussbaum rightly points out that these relativist accounts are repellent; the examples
they provide are abominable rather than admirable. In their attempts at radical relativism,
they end up justifying practices and consequences we have very good reason to find
detestable. Nussbaum proposes, in response, what she terms an “internalist essentialism”126.
By this, she means, we could well reject metaphysical realism but still be left with a
somewhat essentialist account of human life, one deriving from understandings of human
history and biology.

126

An earlier, similar idea, the “internalist conception of Philosophy”, concerning knowledge grounded
not metaphysically but experientially, had been put forth by Hilary Putnam in his Reason,Truth and
History (1981) .
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She thinks that we can say that the ability to choose and act is more fundamental to,
and more reflective of, a human life, than, say, the ability to earn $60,000. She thinks that we
should privilege saving human lives over advancing the cult of Srilata Devi. She thinks that
we are rarely ever in doubt when we encounter another human being - and this is for very
precise reasons: because our understandings of history and biology (which are not
metaphysically but experientially grounded) have provided us with some sort of essentialist
account of what it means to be a human being, and what it means not to be one127.

Even though pragmatists do not hold an essentialism of any kind128, Nussbaum’s
account, in many ways, gets to the very heart of what I termed above as pragmatist social
hope (as Rorty called it) or social efficiency (as Dewey called it). Rorty sought to ground his
views about social hope as the basis for creating community on accounts of avoidance of
cruelty - with regards to biological capacities relating to pain and pleasure, and on historically
contingent factors such as cultural humiliation.

127

This idea of recognizing other human beings as human beings, or, say, a dog recognizing another
dog, was first stated by Franklin Henry Giddings in his 1896 work, The Principles of Sociology.
Giddings called this “consciousness of kind”, which he defined as “a state of consciousness in which
any being, whether high or low in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind
with itself”. See 2004 edition, pg. 17 (Cosmo Publications).
128

We agree with Nussbaum, but refuse to categorize this as essentialism - arguing that it is only a
case where we have studied consequences and causal relations of particular kinds in particular
situations at particular times, and are moved to action due to some kind of agreement on desirable
consequences.
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For Dewey, social efficiency129was propped by conceptions of freedom. It meant that
the individual was afforded the capacities to choose and develop her competencies, and from
this, to engage critically with, and to contribute meaningfully to, the functioning of her
society - broadly construed. Dewey’s pragmatic ethics were fundamentally grounded on
experience. He thought that what ethical inquiry constituted in was the use of reflective
intelligence to improve our judgements - and this only came about after acting on those
judgements, not a priori. Moral progress, for Dewey, came about when, upon reflection, we
revised our judgements to cohere with the preferable practicable consequences for the
broadest range of people affected by them - and this was our community.

We have seen people die from smallpox, and from lack of food and water - and this
relates to capacities they possess biologically. We have not, so far as I can tell, seen people
die because they can no longer worship Srilata Devi or Zeus or Jesus Christ. We have,
further, seen the humiliation - irrespective of cultural contexts, and assaults on freedom, that
women all over the world suffer, due to various cultural practices and systemic frameworks;
how they have been denied the freedom to self-determine. We have seen that their conditions
do not represent the best practicable consequences for them - for when afforded choices to
alter these consequences, they have taken them. We seek, as pragmatists interested in
meliorism, to pursue moral progress by helping them attain the capacities to choose what to
do with their lives. In this sense, we aim to think of them as members of our community.

129

The term was first introduced into academic parlance by Benjamin Kidd in his 1884 book, “Social
Evolution”. Kidd was a social Darwinist - and the consequences of his school of thought are largely
abominable to most of us right now. When Dewey took up the term, he sought to imbue it with a
humanism. Relating especially to his views on education, Dewey made “social efficiency” a good and
humanistic value to aspire to.
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But just like we have genuine differences about some issues even within our liberal
community, these differences exist too with these other members of our created community.
And just like, within the bounds of some harm principle, we do not force members of our
liberal community to do things they do not wish to, and instead seek to persuade them, so too,
with these members of our created community, we do not force upon them the choices we
ourselves think are good; we only present them with the capacity to choose. They are free, if
they so wish, to, in our view, waste those choices - to reject the smallpox vaccine and
continue worshiping Srilata Devi. So long as they have that choice to “waste”, and so long as
they are reasonably informed about the practicable consequences of whatever course of
action they decide to take.

This gets us to Addams’ second R - research. The essence of this Deweyan notion of
reflective intelligence and social efficiency is not applicable only in creating a framework for
solidarity, but also in outlining what orientation this community then takes when it makes
decisions concerning practicable outcomes. When we conduct scientific experiments, we
hypothesize, and then test to see weather the results confirm the hypotheses. So too, with
value judgements, putting them into practice and seeing whether we like the consequences in
the ways the judgement predicted, is the only way of confirming or disconfirming them (i.e.
making a habit of repeating or not repeating the same action) until we have further
experience. Nussbaum would like to call the tested judgements we have come to have so far
essential; we agree with her in practice, but because pragmatists are skeptics, we leave room
for doubt - for the possibility that the world may yet provide us with information that alters
our conceptions.
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For Dewey then, in conducting Addams’ research about what presents the best
practicable outcomes, we must remember that though intelligent value judgements proceed
from this logic of experimentation, they involve more than just this sort of experimenting to
see if we value the consequences. For a clearer picture of the limits of experimentation only,
imagine how it would look like if we all took to tasting any foreign looking objects to see if
they could kill us!

Intelligent value judgements consist, rather, in drawing analogous judgements
concerning potential consequences between novel scenarios and past experiences. It involves
constantly incorporating these new consequences into the wider framework of what we
consider “experience”, such that the next time we have a novel scenario, the consequences of
the judgements we made in past scenarios affect how we look at the new one.

The result of this is that we come to have some sort of provisional knowledge about
what to do and what not to do, based on the consequences of doing or not doing those things;
a knowledge based entirely on experience and intelligent judgement as opposed to an
essentialist account of any sort, and therefore a knowledge that could always potentially
change based on future experience. We refuse to say that any question is settled; but we think
we have good reason to act in certain ways in order to attain certain consequences we think to
be good. This is the essence of contingency.
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So while Nussbaum’s internalist essentialist account gets to similar points as what we
pragmatists believe, unlike Nussbaum, in speaking about amelioration, we refuse to provide a
list of criterion, even a very vague, fungible one, of what makes a human life worth living; or
regarding what exact conditions we think need to obtain for a life to be considered “well
lived”. We pragmatists, in advocating for the spreading of the values we champion - values
that we think meliorate, resort to the unsatisfying tactic of stating Mill’s example about
Haydn and the oyster130, we simply describe our experience - “this is what we do” - and then
invite comparison.

We say that our (liberal) values are experientially grounded on “comparisons between
societies which exemplify these habits and those which do not, leading up to the suggestion
that nobody who has experienced both would prefer the latter”131. We insist that experience
has shown us that with regards to pain, pleasure and humiliation, the consequences of some
actions have been preferable, and the consequences of some not so- or if at all, for very few
of us.

This is to say, that fewer children who are vaccinated die from childhood diseases
than children who are not vaccinated; that those who eat usually live, and those who do not

In this example, very well outlined by Roger Crisp in his book, Mill on Utilitarianism (1997), one is
offered the choice of living the life of Joseph Haydn- a wonderful composer, traveller, man of letters basically someone who lived, in our conception, a rich and fulfilling life - but only for seventy seven
years. Or one is offered the life of a lobster, consisting of “only mild sensual pleasure, rather like that
experienced by humans when floating very drunk in a warm bath” - but for a million years. The idea is
that most human beings would choose Haydn’s lie over that of the lobsters, for having experienced
the “higher pleasures” which Haydn experienced, and the “lower pleasures” which we suppose the
lobster experiences, we could not but choose Haydn’s life. So too, we pragmatists want to say that
anyone who has lived in a society which promotes toleration and freedom of speech, and in a society
which does not do so, will, if given the choice, choose the one that promotes these values.
130
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eat usually die - and that life is a preferable consequence as compared to death. When faced
with situations requiring action, the pragmatist grounds her conduct on an intelligent
appraisal of these consequences, and chooses the course of action with the most preferable
consequences for the broadest range of people, if she already knows what that is, or she seeks
agreement on what this preferable consequence might be if she does not already know. This
is both the basis for our notion of shared community which we seek to expand as widely as
possible, as well as the framework for research regarding what we think meliorates

Making Space for Democracy

With this conception of anti-essentialism in mind, I now turn to the interaction of
democracy and beneficence in pragmatist ethics in tackling that third R: Reform

A rejection of these sorts of essentialism leaves us pragmatists at a sort of halfway
house in the kind of work the effective altruists are engaged in. On the one hand, we think
that, as regards those things which experience and research has so far shown to be necessary
for the continued existence of human beings and animals (we think existence is good) - based
on their status as beings of particular biological kinds - we have good reason to desire these
things, and we think beings similar to us in these biological facticities also have good reason
to desire these things (and to shun the converse of these things).

May 2018, Wolf Humanities Center Undergraduate Research Fellowship
John Aggrey Odera, College of Arts & Sciences, 2019, University of Pennsylvania
90

This is the (circular) intertwining of the first two R’s: We have created a notion of
community based around these commonalities regarding pain, pleasure and humiliation, and
from this notion of community, we have this shared understanding of common experience, of
what results are preferable, to whom among us, and what results are not - this constitutes our
“research”.

So we think - when it comes to the third R - reform, as the effective altruists do, for
example, that animals should not be subjected to pain and torture, and to all the other kinds of
malaise that comes with such things as factory farming, and we work collectively to convince
others about this, and to realize the consequences we hope for. We think that human beings
should have access to things such as food and shelter and medical care, and we think think
that they should have similar freedoms as those we have in our liberal community. On the
basis, grounded from our other two R’s - the notion of community deriving from intelligent
understanding of and research on shared experience, we seek to realize these practical goals.

In our activity concerning reform, we extend our understanding of ourselves based on
these biological facilities to others who share them too. And we think that based on these
biological commonalities, these others also have reason to desire the things that we do, due to
our shared possession of these facilities. But we do not hold that there is such a thing as an
inherent moral obligation, one from outside, grounding our beliefs; such a thing as a one to
one mapping between our beliefs and reality that demands things from us. We think, that if
any meaningful action is to occur concerning these things, that we need to convince people to
believe as we do about these things, and the only way to do so is not by asserting objectivity,
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but by describing our position in the best ways possible; by giving reasons why we consider it
good, and then providing the option that each of us might chose what strikes them as
providing the best practicable consequences.

On the other hand, we recognize our ethnocentrism, such that even though we think
we have good reason to deem some things good because of their consequences to us, we
recognize that for various reasons - historical and cultural contingencies, for example, other
people and other cultures might not value the things that we value, or to the same extents. We
thus realize that we cannot impose anything. We understand that any engagements with these
other people, in the hope of changing their minds - or ours - so as to produce the best
preferable outcomes, is going to involve reason giving and receiving. We are open, as
pragmatists interested in social melioration, and as skeptics, to be transformed by the
reasoned conversations we have with others, just as much as we hope that they too retain
some pliability within their convictions; a pliability which might enable potential
transformation on their part.

The result of this is state of continued discussion mediated by democratic experience.
We understand that even in the process of beneficence and reform, we cannot divorce what
we think is important, from what others, most importantly those who are the targets of our
beneficence, think is important.

Let us turn to “the fats”, as William James put it. How would this possibly look like in
practice?
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Part of the challenge of my project here - which means it can never be as neat as a
typical philosophical theory, is that trying to put forth a pragmatist theory (of anything)
constitutes a paradox. Pragmatists are contextualists; they do not think it is possible to state
an overarching theory of anything. Dewey says, “The standard of success for value
judgements is developed internally to the practice at hand, relative to the people’s
descriptions of their problems”132. Dewey thought that there was no way we could have
standards of valuation that were external to context and practice, and that were unbound from
learning gained through trial and error, and then extended to intelligent judgement.

But perhaps for a clearer understanding of exemplums of how I think pragmatist
democracy, as a hazy school of thought, may instantiate Addam’s third R; may deal with the
problems we currently face, it would be better to look at specific cases.

There were three main problems that I pointed out in the second section of this essay,
three main things I thought were wrong with effective altruism. These were 1.) Effective
Altruism’s reliance on “moral experts”, and therefore cultivation of moral imbeciles, 2.)
Effective altruism’s lack of engagement with meaningful structural reform, and its heavy
reliance on “the markets”, despite the well-documented role of the markets in causing
deprivation, and 3.) What I called the “Bernard Williams critique”: the idea that Effective
Altruism’s deep emphasis on maximization, a supposedly objective moral imperative that
abstracts from our lives, presents a philosophy that simply asks too much from us, and leaves
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Dewey, John. (1922). Human Nature and Conduct. Pg. 208.
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us very vulnerable to that Nietzschean question: Is this solidarity real? And thus to a relativist
rejection of any notion of moral progress.

Here, I will briefly explore how pragmatism deals with the first two of these very
particular examples ( I believe Bernard Williams said everything that was there to be said
concerning the third critique, and that his position was not one that the pragmatists would
disagree with).

On Moral Experts and Imbeciles

Deweyan Pragmatism’s insistence on radical democracy as necessary for reform
automatically precludes the notion of “moral experts”, and all the pernicious consequences
that come with them. Dewey’s views on radical democracy were influenced, to a very large
extent, by Charles Sanders Peirce . Declared the “founder” of pragmatism by William James,
Peirce was a brilliant logician, mathematician and philosopher who was also, early on in his
life, an undemocratic racist133.

In one of the earliest pieces of writing to be considered “Pragmatist” philosophy,134
Peirce laid out four methods he thought people came to ground their beliefs. The first one
was the method of tenacity - whereby one, by repeating something to themselves, by saying it

133

A funny anecdote: Peirce, influenced by his brilliant and racist father, Benjamin Peirce - perhaps
the greatest American Mathematician of his generation, so rejected the equality of ‘negroes’ that he
took the syllogism “All men have equal political rights, negroes are men, therefore negroes are equal
in political rights to white people” to be indicative of a failure in traditional logic.
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until they themselves bought it, came to believe whatever it was they were saying. This was
the essence of Lyndon Johnson’s phrase “what convinces is conviction”135. Peirce thought
this method unsustainable, the “social impulse” was against it; for if we encountered other
people who believed differently and just as strongly, then our confidence in our own beliefs
would be shaken.

The second method was that of authority - where there was an authority that provided
ideas about what to believe, and policed how people went about doing this; a chief means of
upholding certain “theological and political” doctrines - the church, the king. While this
method could be accompanied by immense cruelty (cue in the crusades, colonialism, etc)
Peirce thought it was by far superior to the method of tenacity. Peirce, ever the elitist,
believed that the method of authority was sufficient for most human beings, but insufficient
for the more brilliant minds. It was also flawed, for no institution could hoppe to regulate
opinions on everything.

The third method was the a priori method, most exemplified by “metaphysical
philosophy”, where systems of belief were adopted not in reference to “facts”, but, as with
my criticisms of effective altruism and broader teleological and deontological philosophy
above, because “their fundamental propositions seemed ‘agreeable to reason’”. Peirce
contended that this was the most intellectual method (of the three so far discussed), but its
failing was that we had to resort to the metaphysicians view of what this unifying,
overarching reason was, and even the metaphysicians themselves disagreed on this.
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Knowledge, by this conception, Peirce thought, became a matter of taste - that of the
metaphysical authority. In his view, we were free to continue to believe in the supremacy of
this uninvolved reason until we are awakened with “rough facts”.

Finally, Peirce laid out what he termed the Scientific method, one that constituted a
matching of contingent fact and opinion - and a willingness to change opinion when
confronted with negating facts - to adopt a new contingency so as to better deal with life. This
method championed constant and conscious reflection and doubt, and a rejection of authority,
tenacity or apriorism. It insisted that belief could not be permanently “fixated”, but that it
was possible to engage intelligently with both our contingent beliefs concerning the world,
and the brute facts that the world continued presenting to us, requiring us to substitute these
beliefs for new ones when prompted to do so.

Dewey was not unconvinced by Peirce’s typology. But unlike Peirce and his
misanthropy, Dewey refused to believe that the method of authority was sufficient for most
of humanity. Dewey’s radical rejection of teleology led to a deep and abiding charity to, and
respectful consideration of, the views of everyone who was potentially affected by an issue136,
a charity that sometimes seemed to verge on the naïve. Indeed, Dewey, together with Tolstoy

136

Dewey’s book was part of a sustained conversation with the famous public intellectual Walter
Lippmann (Credited with introducing the terms “Cold war” and “stereotype”). In his two books, Public
Opinion ( 1922) and The Phantom Public (1925), Lippmann argued for a technocratic elite as best
placed to serve the public interest. Lippmann recognized the stakes that “the public” held in political
life, he simply argued that they (the public) lacked specialized knowledge, were too ill suited to
exercise political power. Their desires were too uncoordinated and un thought out, and if let to reign
free, would spell doom for society.
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and Rousseau, is the most prominent modern thinker who respected the intelligence of the
common man without irony.
In his 1927 work137, Dewey presented his pragmatist conception of democracy as the
most viable means of achieving a public interest. In his later work138, Dewey expounded on
this, construing democracy as a continuous project, a “way of life and an experience built on
faith in human nature, faith in human beings, and faith in working with others”139.

Dewey’s idea was not, as Walter Lippmann, his fiery interlocutor, feared: that an
involvement of the public in public affairs would lead to a case where we had millions of
points of views put across concerning the public good, many of them competing and
conflicting, some of them downright mediocre, therefore leading to an inability to do
anything. On the contrary, Dewey thought that, yes, these ideas ought to and would be put
forward, but he did not believe that doing this would derail progress or action. If anything, he
thought it would sharpen our ideas concerning what was contingently good, and produce
better consequences. The town hall, as I mentioned at the beginning of this third section, was
the hallmark of Deweyan democratic life, and the idea was that this was where public
engagement occured.

Public engagement leading to reform, for Dewey, involved primarily reason giving
and reason asking. One person put forth their point of view, gave reasons as to why they
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thought this point of view presented the best consequences for the public. The rest of us
debated this, giving reasons - based on some form of research, as to why we thought it
preferable or not; proposing alternate, sometimes contrary, points of view; and engaging in
debates concerning these too. The search was for an agreement concerning a course of
actionable reform regarding the issue at hand, and sometimes these agreements would not be
easy to come by. When this happened, Dewey thought the process of deliberation even more
necessary at such times.

In our increasingly globalized times, our task is to extend the concept of the town hall
(i.e. community) to the interwebs, to blogs and online forums and books and radio and tv
shows; to the decision-making chambers of global organizations, and to any ways that we
have to communicate with each other; any ways that seeks to engage with pertinent issues
concerning shared consequences that we suffer as a (global) public - think, climate change,
threats from AI, disease, hunger, immigration etc.

Some, like Lippmann, seeing this democratic attempt at reform, would characterize it
as the “invasion of the idiots”140; they would view it as an exemplum of how, in
democratizing forums of discourse, our public discourse deteriorates, and how due to this
deterioration in discourse, practical action in the world is the worse for it. They would

140

Quote from Umberto Eco. The quote in Full: “Social media gives legions of idiots the right to speak
when they once only spoke at a bar after a glass of wine, without harming the community. Then they
were quickly silenced, but now they have the same right to speak as a Nobel Prize Winner. It is the
invasion of the idiots… The drama of the internet is that it has promoted the village idiot to the bearer
of truth”. Quote lifted from La Stampa Cultura. Umberto Eco: “Con i social parola a legioni di imbecilli”.
https://www.lastampa.it/2015/06/10/cultura/eco-con-i-parola-a-legioni-di-imbecilli-XJrvezBN4XOoyo0h
98EfiJ/pagina.html
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hearken back to Peirce’s description of authority, demanding that we, the public, leave the
important issues to the experts, who can discuss them dispassionately and expertly.

Dewey, on the other hand, would argue that was wrong was not the democratization
of discourse, but rather the fact that it was not conducted intelligently or with good faith; that
it did not efficiently make use of Addams’ other two R’s i.e. that either its conception of
community was warped - too parochial so as to not take into equal consideration others who
were also affected by the consequences of some actions, or that it did not involve the giving
and taking of validly held reasons, and sometimes if it did, that these reasons were held so
blindly as to not be pliable to the views of others141.

For Dewey, hearkening back to Peirce’s scientific method, even authority (“science”,
nobel laureates etc.) were to be held to the principle of reason giving and receiving. It was
only with robust public engagement that any policy put forth, any idea suggested, that
required the cooperation of the public to be implemented, could move forward.

Yet even within this public proliferation of ideas, Dewey did not think that all ideas
had equal merit. He thought that we could intelligently evaluate the practical consequences of
some of them, and provisionally reject them, and that we could provisionally adopt those
141

In fact Dewey thought that experts were much more at risk of such a scenario of unpliability than
the public was. In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey wrote of how the various intersecting habits
and impulses of various communities and individuals in democratic societies affected each other,
meaning that if individuals and communities had any hope for survival, their views necessarily had to
be pliable to reason (here’s Darwin’s influence again). For example, say I strongly believed a certain
herb to be an appetite enhancer, and others within my community, based on experience, believed it to
be poisonous. If I was not pliable to their reason-giving, and ended up consuming the herb and thus
dieing, then that would be it for me. Experts on the other hand, while important, worked necessarily
from abstraction, and as Peirce pointed out in the criticism of authority, they just could not regulate
opinions, ways of practice and living in the messiness of real life.
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which promised preferable consequences. He only insisted, much like John Stuart Mill, that
these ideas be put out there; he thought, along with Mill, that a democratic basket full of ideas
presented the best chance for social reconstruction, for the more ideas we had, the greater the
chance that we would have good ones among them. Good ideas, Dewey thought, were not the
preserve of experts; we would not leave it to them.

What does this mean in the specific case of beneficence? It means, to begin with, as I
have been arguing throughout, that under the pragmatist conception, we cannot have, from
the outset, moral experts declare what is important due to some metric agreed upon by some
authority, insist on its maximization, or its supremacy, and then impose it on others based on
this supposed objectivity. It means that in our attempts at reform - Addams’ third R, we have
no choice but to hearken back to the other two R’s - to create a notion of community due to
shared experience based on the commonalities I outlined above, and to conduct research on
this common experience, and what the preferred practicable consequences are for all
members of that community.

This necessitates that we acknowledge the messiness of the world; that if we have
ideas that we think are good and that we think merit attention, then our recourse is to
convince others about the preferable consequences of these ideas giving reasons, and by
realizing that those reasons might conflict with other validly held reasons. A (now global)
society that engaged in this activity of reason giving and receiving without resorting to
teleologies, Dewey thought, constituted a public, in the best sense of the word, and was best
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suited to tackle any issues that faced it, avoiding the notions of moral experts - and
subsequent moral imbeciles.

This meant that when we decided if and where to donate, it was not because it was
objectively “better” to donate to AI research as opposed to cancer research due to some
objective moral duty to maximize, but rather because we had intelligently engaged with the
problems facing us, and decided (or not) to take a particular course of action. It meant that as
long as our views were pliable to reason, we were bound to have our minds changed
whenever we encountered it; that as long as we thought of those others as part of “us”, we
were bound to engage with the problems affecting them, without asserting our own
categorizations and rankings of those problems, nor an objective metaphysics to ground them.

This does not leave us at a neat place, with all the numbers crunched and the precise
courses of action outlined; but it leaves us at an honest place. We pragmatists cannot say
whether AI research is more important than Malaria research - we do not think such a ranking
of such disparate things affecting different people in different ways is possible - for there is
no teleology to ground them. But we think both are problems. The pragmatist view then is
that of seeking solidarity to attempt to tackle both these problems intelligently. If deliberation
comes up with the idea of which one of different causes requires the majority of our
resources, that idea will be subject to potential change, and it will be grounded on our
agreement as to what issues we deem most pertinent, and how to ensure that those members
of our public affected by other issues, and who also have a say on this issue, are sufficiently
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cared for. There is no eliminibility here - no one issue being subsumed by another. So long as
the issue affects our public, we seek to address it. But how to address it?

On Structural Reform

Much of the essence of John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy was concerned with the
fact that he thought philosophy had become a discipline that did not engage with life;
abstracted too much from the “questions of men”, and instead dealt with the questions of
philosophers - questions which were not of practical use to the values and social conditions of
everyday life. Dewey set forth to reimagine philosophy; to reconstruct it as a “general theory
of education” or as a “criticism of criticisms” - an activity that interdependent organisms
participated in so as to intelligently engage with their environing conditions. This, to be done
well, required democracy - “a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated
experience”142

In this process of engaging with public life so as to promote the ideals of democracy,
Dewey wore many hats. He was the foremost educational reform advocate in the United
States; America’s leading public intellectual of the first half of the twentieth century; easily
the most prominent Pragmatist - perhaps, as a school of thought, America’s greatest (only?)
original contribution to western philosophy; one of the most prominent psychologists - and
founders of the field (and still one of the most cited); founder of many organizations, and
member of many boards, which sought to engage with public life - for example, the
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organizations that later became the NAACP143, and the ACLU; a prominent supporter of
women’s suffrage and the settlement house movement (led by Addams); President of the
League for Industrial Democracy; Chairman of the Congress for Cultural Freedoms, just to
name a few.

For the same reasons, Dewey was also actively involved in the plight of intellectuals
and activists during his time. He edited a volume on the “Bertrand Russell Case”144, and, at
the influence of his student, Sidney Hook, was head of the eponymous Dewey Commission
which cleared Leon Trotsky of the accusations against him made by Joseph Stalin145 . Dewey
was a great admirer of Eugene V. Debs, sympathising with Debs’ views on the Pullman
Strikes146, and, at a time when it was incredibly unfashionable, Dewey declared himself a
democratic socialist147, strongly advocating for Georgist proposals to tax land values so as to
lessen economic inequalities148. He was, for most of his adult life, viewed as “dangerously
radical”149
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Regarding the prominent British Philosopher, Lord Russell’s denial of permission to teach, and
demotion from position as Professor, at the City University of New York due to charges that Russell,
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Here Dewey, I argue, showed to a remarkable extent what an engaged public life, and
one that was attuned to the works of systems, looked like. Dewey’s core concern which
marked all his work was, by nature, structural. Social life, he thought, could only be sustained
when it was conceived of as an organism - and individuals as its constituent parts. If the
well-being of one part was not taken care of, then the well-being of the organism was
compromised; to ameliorate the individual part, we would have to ameliorate the organism,
and vice versa.

He was thus at once concerned about publics coming together to solve problems that
affected them collectively, hence his huge role as a public intellectual and as an involved
actor in tackling social problems; as he was about what he considered “inchoate publics” those publics lacking “the critical education, time, and attention necessary for inquiry” that
presentented “democracy with perhaps its most significant and undermining condition”150 those who, for various reasons, some of them market caused, could not participate in public
“inquiry”.

To tackle this, Dewey came up with conception of individualism that he believed
was humanistic enough to address these broader structural issues.

To begin, Dewey conceived of individual freedom as “a distinctive way of feeling the
impacts of the world, and of showing a preferential bias in response to these impacts”151. But

Quote original from Dewey in The Public and its Problems, cited here from the entry on Dewey on
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey/#PoliPhil
150
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this idea of freedom as making choice possible was social, for the very notion of individuality
was borne upon, and shaped by, social conditions - there was no individual thriving that
occured without a social environing that made it possible. Consequently, to attempt to solve
individual problems without tackling the social conditions that engendered them was a waste
of time.

Dewey’s politics reflected this. Especially in the 1930s, when the effects of the Great
Depression ravaged America, Dewey insisted strongly that individuality -in the sense he
construed it - could only be supported by a socialized economy. To this effect, he strongly
fought for reforms that he believed advanced this conception: - the strengthening of workers’
rights - especially as regards unionization; and the democratization of the workplace, both in
terms of ownership structures and hierarchy. This, he thought, would provide room for those
inchoate publics to become part of our deliberation and inquiry.

For all these desired ends, democracy was the means. Dewey could not help but see
that there was politics to everything; in the family, in the school yard, and yes, in charity. If,
therefore,charity - or anything really, was to address “the problems of men”, it had to enable
this concept of individual freedom that Dewey was so taken by152. To some extent, this
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In this sense, the Deweyan conception of individual freedom is quite similar to the capabilities
approach championed by Sen and Nussbaum. The differences, of course, are that Sen’s and
Nussbaum’s conceptions do not attach as strongly an importance to the social environment as
Dewey’s, and, like Sen but unlike Nussbaum, Dewey refuses to provide a list of these freedoms or
capabilities.
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required historicizing; research on what the roots of certain social ills were153, on the publics
affected by said problems, on whether they were “inchoate” or not.

This was why Dewey was so captivated by Addams, whose three R’s perfectly
typified this notion of structural reform. Residence (community) - from the outset,
articulating the social nature of the problem; Research - democratic inquiry and deliberation
into what factors engendered said problems, and into what ways to tackle it; and Reform - the
communication and implementation of solutions that had been arrived at through a
democratic process. This, Dewey believed, was the proper framework for approaching
structural reform; for he thought that it got to the heart of his project: ameliorating the part
and the whole.

153

This was best typified by both William James and Dewey who, upon reading DuBois’ (who was
James’ student at Harvard) Souls of Black Folk, understood the specificities of the case of the African
American in America, and the necessity of historicism in understanding the practical consequences of
issues such as systemic racism.
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CONCLUSION

“Philosophy leaves everything as it is”, Wittgenstein said, in his posthumously
published Investigations154. Wittgenstein’s book ushered in the Linguistic turn in philosophy
(which Neopragmatists like Rorty greatly made use of), where the role of philosophy, done
correctly, came to be viewed as descriptive rather than prescriptive - eliminating contingent
misunderstanding by providing continuous attempts at clarity, rather than detailing norms
about what was acceptable.

The latter task, Wittgenstein thought, was the work of science, art, religion, politics
etc. In this framework, philosophy’s task was seen as, by its power to attempt to describe the
ever changing vagaries of life, clearing the way for those other things to act in the world.
“What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards, and we are clearing up the ground of
language on which they stood”155.

In this sense, American Pragmatism is both philosophical and anti-philosophical. It is
philosophical in so much as it coheres with Wittgenstein’s description of activity that he
considered “philosophical” - that which clears space without offering non-contingent norms.
It is anti-philosophical in so far as it flies in the face of what was, since Plato, considered
proper philosophy - that activity that authoritatively prescribed norms, and ruled over life
abstractly. The function of philosophies such as pragmatism is to provide therapy for those
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other kinds of philosophies which make absolute claims about reality. The utilitarianism
typified by Effective Altruism is “philosophical” in the second way (in the sense that
pragmatism is anti-philosophical) - it offers absolute claims based on objectivity.

This project has been an attempt to look at these two kinds of philosophies (their
epistemologies, really), and the sort of practical ethics that arise from them, particularly
regarding meliorism. I have argued that the framework of orientation that undergirds
pragmatism, by its skepticism and its attunement to context, tragedy, and contingency,
provides much better grounds for social meliorism. And I have argued that the pernicious
consequences that I see Effective Altruism as having, in terms of its promotion of moral
heedlessness, its lack of attention to systemic reform, and its demandingness, are related to its
status as the kind of objectivity-invoking philosophy which Wittgenstein was referring to.

Our task then, as I have constantly reiterated, is to start hearkening to that first
question posed by Peirce - What are the practicable consequences of this? - rather than that
one posed by Plato/ Socrates - What is this? Our beneficent actions, and our notions of moral
progress, I strongly believe, will be better off for it.
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